IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 1

40 Copies

copy no. 23

Einsatzgruppe A

Consolidated Report up to October 15, 1941

I.

Overview

II.

Police Work

A. Organizational Measures

B. Cleansing and Securing the Operations Area

C. Counterespionage

D. Investigation of Personnel and Card-File Matters

E. Criminal Police Work

III.

Situation Report

A. Situation Prior to the Entry of German Troops

B. Situation of the Aspects of Life up to October 15, 1941

C. Jewish Influence on the Aspects of Life in the Ostland

IV.

Predicaments and Recommendations for Eliminating Them

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 2

In compliance with orders, after the vehicles had been made operational, Einsatzgruppe A departed

for the assembly area on June 23, 1941, the second day of the Eastern Campaign. Army Group

North, with the 16th and 18th Armies and Panzer Group IV, had started its advance the previous

day. It was now a matter of rushing to make personal contact with the Army commanders as well

as with the commander of the Army Group Rear Area. From the outset, it can be stressed that

cooperation with the Wehrmacht was generally good, and in individual cases, such as with Panzer

Group IV under General Höppner, cooperation was very close, indeed, almost cordial.

Misunderstandings which arose with individual offices during the first days were substantially

eliminated through personal discussions.

Army Group North advanced quickly to the Neman River and reached the Daugava River after

brief but often violent skirmishes. From there, Panzer Group IV, followed by the 16th and 18th

Armies to the right and left rear, respectively, conquered all of Latvia in one swift advance. It

reached old Russian territory near Ostrov and Pskov and from there pushed forward in the direction

of Luga, while the left flank of the Army Group crossed the Estonian border and reached Pärnu

and Tartu.

Difficult battles on the Army’s right flank had already previously occurred.

Henceforth, the Russians held their position with strong forces, preventing the continued swift

advance towards Petersburg which had been anticipated and ardently desired by both the

leadership and the troops. The capture of Petersburg would have eliminated the most important

base and would have meant a kind of completion of the northerly advance of the Army Group.

The Luga Sector was then subdued with prolonged fighting and many casualties and, as one

command-echelon officer expressed it, became “a holy road of death.”

The mopping-up

operations which followed in the old Russian territory also occasioned long, drawn-out fighting.

While the Russians continued to press hard against the Army Group’s flank from the east, the

Army Group was successful in isolating Petersburg and thus concluding its large-scale operations

for the time being.

During this military advance of the first few days of the Eastern Campaign, it became apparent to

the Security Police that the specific tasks of the security police would have to be performed not

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 3

only in the Army Group Rear Area and Army Rear Area, as had been envisioned in the original

arrangements with the OKH [Oberkommando des Heeres, i.e., the Supreme High Command of the

Army], but also in the combat zone.

This was necessitated on the one hand because the

organization of the Army Rear Area lagged behind the very swift advance, and because the

demoralizing effect of Communist activity and partisan combat – especially when the Luga Sector

was reached – was strongest in the combat zone itself.

In order to carry out the security-police tasks, it was necessary to strive to enter the larger cities

together with the troops. The first experiences in this regard were gathered when a small advance

detachment under my command entered Kaunas on June 25, 1941, together with the vanguard of

the Wehrmacht. Also when the other larger cities were captured, specifically Liepāja, Jelgava,

Riga, Tartu, Tallinn, and the larger suburbs of Petersburg, a detachment of the Security Police was

among the first units in each instance. Most of all, Communist functionaries and Communist

material had to be seized, but also the troops had to be safe-guarded from potential surprises in the

cities, since the troops usually lacked the manpower to do this themselves. Towards this end, the

Security Police set up volunteer formations consisting of reliable local inhabitants in the three

Baltic provinces during the early hours of the invasion; under our leadership, these formations

carried out this task successfully. It should be mentioned as an example that the troops suffered

not insignificant losses due to sniper fire in Riga on the left bank of the Daugava River, whereas

after this volunteer formation was set up in Riga, not a single soldier was harmed on the right side

of the Daugava River, although these Latvian formations suffered dead and wounded in their

encounters with isolated Russians.

Likewise during the first hours after the invasion, albeit with considerable difficulty, indigenous

antisemitic forces were incited to pogroms against the Jews. As ordered, the Security Police were

determined to solve the Jewish question by all means and with all decisiveness. It was not

undesirable, however, that this not appear immediately, as the unusually harsh measures would

also have created a sensation in German circles. It had to be demonstrated that the indigenous

population itself had carried out the first measures independently, as a natural reaction to the

decades of oppression by the Jews and to the terror created by the Communists in the recent past.

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 4

After the Daugava River – and, with it, Riga – had been reached, the Einsatzgruppe temporarily

discontinued its advance with Army Group North and concentrated its forces on the pacification

of the Lithuanian and Latvian area and later, of the old Russian territory, which they reached near

Opochka. The work involved here was extremely varied.

With the rapid turnover of the German troops and the fluctuations that existed in the German

offices caused by the transition from Army Rear Area to the Army Group Rear Area and later to

the Civil Administration or to the Wehrmacht Commander, persons and viewpoints changed all

too often and all too hastily at the German offices. This had to be prevented to the extent possible

in the Security Police, and for that reason the same commanders had to stay in the same locations

when possible. As a result, the Security Police was well ahead of everyone else in its expertise

and information about individuals. The Security Police can indeed claim that it was the only

office that had attained a certain stability on the German side. The Lithuanians, Latvians, and

Estonians, who are very sensitive about such things, realized this very soon and acted accordingly.

For this reason, the Security Police tried to guide the political, economic, and cultural affairs

according to the same points of view, or to advise the other German offices responsible for these

matters. The various responsible offices pursued different points of view, especially in the

political area. It was a shame that the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories had not set

clear guidelines at the outset, because despite all our efforts, the circumstances in the Baltic

Provinces are still not clear. The example of Estonia is indicative of the fluctuation. With the

approval of the Reich Security Main Office, the Einsatzgruppe brought the Estonian Dr. [Hjalmar]

Mäe along as a future political adviser for the Estonians. In order to prevent the chaotic confusion

that had prevailed in Lithuania and Latvia, and in order to install Dr. Mäe, i.e., to prevent his

dismissal, a series of negotiations had to be conducted with the division advancing into Tallinn;

with the corps responsible for Tallinn; with the Ortskommandantur [i.e., the local military

administrative headquarters] in Tallinn; with the Feldkommandantur [i.e., the “regional” military

administrative headquarters] in Tallinn; with the 18th Army; with Army Group North; with the

Commander of the Army Group Rear Area of the Army Group North; with the Generalkommissar,

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 5

or with his deputy; and with the representative of the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories.

After the capture of Lithuania and Latvia, Einsatzkommandos 2 and 3 were essentially detached

from the Commander of the Army Group Rear Area and were left behind in Lithuania and Latvia,

respectively. The commanders of Einsatzkommandos 2 and 3 have remained in Kaunas and Riga,

respectively, since the beginning of July.

The Einsatzgruppe as well as the Einsatzkommandos immediately contacted the Reich Commissar

upon his appointment, as well as the Generalkommissars. Cooperation with the Reich Commissar

was initially dependent on the fact that (a) an inquiry to the Reich Security Main Office concerning

the type of involvement by the Reich Commissar was delayed, and (b) the Higher SS and Police

Leader had negotiated on his own directly with the Reich Commissar regarding the involvement

of the police, with the result that an initiative of our own was not possible before the resolution of

questions (a) and (b). There are plans to take up contact with the Reich Commissar from this end

directly in this regard at an appropriate time. There are sufficient specific reasons to do this.

After the advance of Army Group North was delayed in Estonia and near Luga and heavy fighting

and strong Russian attacks occurred in the center and on the right flank, the Einsatzgruppe once

again became greatly involved with the armies, as well as with Panzer Group IV, since the

suppression of the partisans, who were now appearing in large numbers, was and remains a specific

task of the Security Police. The area north of Pskov and between Lake Peipus and Lake Ilmen

with its large expanse of wooded and marshy areas provided ideal conditions for partisan warfare

by the Russians. Moreover, because of the impassable terrain, every deployment, even of smaller

units, became extremely difficult. After purely military suppression by the posting of guards or

the deployment of entire divisions to comb the newly-occupied territory had failed, the

Wehrmacht, too, had to look for new methods. It was this search for new methods that the

Einsatzgruppe took on as its essential task. Consequently, the Wehrmacht soon adopted the

experiences and methods of the Security Police in their fight against the partisans. For details, I

refer to the numerous reports on suppression of the partisans.

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 6

The on-going deployment of the Security Police in partisan suppression was impeded by the fact

that the vehicles were either not operational or they needed to be spared for the still-anticipated

advance on Petersburg.

During this period, the leadership of the Einsatzgruppe was faced with particular difficulties.

Although the bulk of the Security Police was deployed in Lithuania and Latvia, 700 kilometers to

the rear, other units were deployed for partisan suppression behind the front, which was almost

600 kilometers long. In addition to the communications van stationed in Riga, only one small and

one medium-sized communications van were available for this extensive area. Even the army

telephone system failed beyond a range of 200 kilometers. The management of the Einsatzgruppe

as a whole was therefore possible only through personal contact, even though the paths and roads,

including the Rollbahn [i.e., the “taxiway,” a series of roads designated by the Germans to serve

as an express supply line to the front], were in an almost indescribable state. Even on the Rollbahn

it was sometimes only possible to drive an average of 10 kilometers per hour. Nevertheless, my

vehicle alone had to cover 15,000 kilometers in this period.

The commanders of the

Einsatzkommandos also had similar difficulties in these vast territories, with even courier runs

becoming a serious problem.

These conditions were temporarily aggravated when the further assault on Petersburg could no

longer follow the major road from Pskov via Luga but instead had to detour far to the west, thus

shifting the focus of the anti-partisan campaign to the wooded and marshy area east of Lake Peipus

and to the areas west of Lake Ilmen. At that time, the work of the Security Police was impeded

even more by a dysentery epidemic which, with the exception of one officer, infected the entire

staff of the Einsatzgruppe and hospitalized 80%.

Since the encirclement of Petersburg, the situation has eased to the extent that the lateral lines of

communication have been shortened, or are at any rate no longer held by the enemy. The

Einsatzgruppe command was particularly grateful that very soon after offices had been set up, a

very good and useful radio and teletype network was installed by the RSHA

[Reichsicherheitshauptamt, i.e., the Reich Security Main Office].

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 7

In conjunction with the continuing conquest of Estonia, Einsatzkommando la, with the exception

of the part deployed with the 18th Army, was finally transferred to Estonia, the pacification of

which had to be especially emphasized in light of the population’s good racial composition.

After Einsatzgruppe B had relinquished part of White Ruthenia to Einsatzgruppe A,

Einsatzkommando lb, reinforced with elements of Einsatzkommandos 2 and 3, was declared

responsible for this area.

During the encirclement of Petersburg, the Security Police, in addition to dealing with renewed,

very heavy partisan activity in the suburbs, had the task of special surveillance of the population,

which was slowly returning from the forests. Since the battle for Petersburg had developed into

out-and-out trench warfare, it was recommended to the armies to completely evacuate a zone

around Petersburg. This was a measure that the Security Police had already carried out to the

extent possible using forces detailed from the Waffen-SS and the Order Police.

Furthermore, as complete an intelligence network as possible is being established in this area.

From the very beginning, the Security Police has systematically collected intelligence concerning

all aspects of Petersburg.

In addition, the 18th Army has requested that the military

reconnaissance of Petersburg and the reconnaissance of the encircled Russian 8th Army in the

Oranienbaum region be taken over.

For further details, see the nine situation reports on

Petersburg which have previously been provided. In the next few days a comprehensive report

on this subject will also be presented.

As a result of the total situation described above, the members of the Gestapo, Criminal Police,

and SD [i.e., the Sicherheitsdienst, or “Security Service,” of the SS] detailed to the Einsatzgruppe,

primarily in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and White Ruthenia, and to a minor extent in front of

Petersburg, have been deployed against the returning floods of civilians, as have members of the

Order Police and Waffen-SS, mainly in the area in front of Petersburg. In each case, this was

under their own leadership. This measure has been made all the more possible because the

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 8

Einsatzkommandos in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have indigenous policemen available, the

distribution of which is shown in an attachment, and so far 150 Latvian auxiliaries have been sent

to White Ruthenia.

The distribution of officers from the Security Police and SD in the individual phases can be seen

in Attachment 2 [not included here]. The advance and the deployment of the Einsatzgruppe and

the Einsatzkommandos are found in Attachment 3 [not included here].

It should not go

unmentioned that the officers detailed from the Waffen-SS and Order Police who are reservists

have declared their wish to remain with the Security Police and the SD afterwards as well.

A.

The Baltic Area

I.

Organizational Measures

1.

The Formation of the Auxiliary Police and the Schutzmannschaften.

In light of the expansion of the deployment area and the multitude of Security Police tasks, an

attempt was made from the beginning to have the reliable members of the population themselves

participate in the fight against the parasites in their country, i.e., in particular, the Jews and the

Communists. Beyond providing guidance for the first spontaneous self-cleansing operations,

which will be discussed in greater detail in another context, precautions had to be taken to recruit

reliable personnel for the cleansing work and to make them permanent auxiliary units of the

Security Police. Here, too, the differing special circumstances in various parts of the operations

area had to be taken into account.

In Lithuania, activist nationalist forces formed so-called partisan units at the onset of the Eastern

Campaign in order to intervene actively in the fight against Bolshevism. According to their own

account, they suffered 4,000 deaths.

Four larger partisan groups, with which the advance detachment took up immediate contact, had

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 9

been organized in Kaunas. There was no unified leadership for these groups. Rather, each group

attempted to outdo the others and to be as closely connected with the Wehrmacht as possible in

order to be included in a future military deployment against the Soviet Army and to capitalize on

this during the subsequent reorganization of Lithuania and to be able to organize a new Lithuanian

Army. Although military deployment of partisans was out of the question on political grounds,

from the reliable elements of the undisciplined partisan groups an operationally ready auxiliary

unit comprising 300 men was quickly formed, the leadership of which was given to the Lithuanian

journalist [Algirdas] Klimaitis. This group has been deployed during the on-going pacification

efforts not only in Kaunas itself but also in numerous towns in Lithuania and has, under the

constant supervision of the Einsatzkommando, performed its assigned tasks without significant

complaints, especially preparation of and participation in the implementation of major liquidation

operations.

The remaining partisan groups were disarmed without incident.

In addition to the setting up of the partisan deployment force, a Lithuanian Security and Criminal

Police was created right away in the first few days. Initially, forty former Lithuanian police civil

servants, most of whom had been liberated from prisons, were deployed under the leadership of a

senior Lithuanian police civil servant, [Jonas] Denauskas. Moreover, the necessary additional

auxiliary personnel were brought in after being carefully vetted. The Lithuanian Security and

Criminal Police operate in accordance with instructions and guidelines provided to them by

Einsatzkommando 3, and their activities are continually monitored, and, if at all possible, they are

used for security police work which cannot be performed by the SD’s own personnel – specifically,

manhunts, arrests, and searches. Significant portions of the fugitive records, which had been

taken away by the retreating Russians, have been found in Vilnius and evaluated by police.

In a similar way, useful auxiliary organs were created in Vilnius and Šiauliai from Lithuanian selfdefense forces that had established themselves on their own initiative under the name of

“Lithuanian Security and Criminal Police.” A comprehensive purge of personnel was necessary

in Vilnius in particular, because there it was largely unemployed government civil servants and

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 10

employees without any specialized knowledge and even some politically compromised elements

that had banded together in the Lithuanian Security Police. Here, too, after the removal of the

compromised and unusable persons and under the constant supervision of Einsatzkommando 3,

the Lithuanian Security and Criminal Police is also performing entirely useful work.

The difficulties in various spheres resulting from the ethnic mixture living in the Vilnius territory,

i.e., Lithuanians, Poles, White Ruthenians, and Russians, can also be noticed in the deployment of

the auxiliary police organs. In the counties largely populated by Poles, Saleimnikai [Šalčininkai],

Ashmyany, and Lida, Polish Auxiliary Police Forces are still active at this time.

The

irreconcilable hatred between Poles and Lithuanians here makes it necessary to place Lithuanian

civil servants under German protection when they carry out investigations and arrests. The Polish

Auxiliary Police will soon be disbanded.

When personnel are added to the Lithuanian Auxiliary Police, they are recruited mainly from the

partisan groups. As long as executions and pacification operations still have to be implemented

on a large scale, the aforementioned partisan unit will remain intact, in addition to the Lithuanian

Security and Criminal Police, and it will probably be used at a later time in another part of the

deployment area outside of Lithuania.

Strength and distribution of the Lithuanian Auxiliary Police can be seen in Attachment 4.

In Latvia after the arrival of German troops, a self-defense force was organized, comprising

members from all walks of life, some of whom were for this reason totally unfit for police work.

The point was to form a useful squad out of these indiscriminately assembled and variously armed

troops, and above all to eliminate those elements that tried to disguise their Communist beliefs or

their otherwise compromised pasts by joining the self-defense formations.

In Riga the first placements were made by the Security Police itself, and, as in the other cities of

Latvia, initially formed were security commandos, which were later transformed into an Auxiliary

Police Force, which now uniformly consists of selected, dependable, and specially trained men.

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 11

In the major cities a prefect was placed at the head of the Auxiliary Police. The Auxiliary Police

formations are divided into Security Police and Order Police. The Auxiliary Security Police,

which works under constant supervision of Einsatzkommando 2, from which it receives its work

guidelines and to which it must continually furnish detailed reports on its activity, is divided into

a political police division and a criminal police division.

The Auxiliary Police formations set up for order police purposes were handed over to the German

Order Police after their later insertion into Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia for mentoring and for

the formation of Schutzmannschaften.

The pay of the entire Latvian Auxiliary Police comes out of funds from the Latvian police budget.

After this most urgent task of organizing the Auxiliary Police had been completed in the cities,

especially in Riga, the County Police Chiefs were appointed in the individual counties of Latvia

as the responsible officers for the police work in the countryside and the small towns. These posts

were entrusted to trained experts, usually former Latvian police officers. Since the County Police

Chiefs frequently had difficulty asserting themselves vis-à-vis the Self-Protection officers

subordinate to them and since the latter were frequently guilty of acting on their own authority,

the Self-Protection Forces – which were frequently completely under the influence of the local

garrisons [Ortskommandanturen], were converted into Schutzmannschaften soon after the civil

administration took over. The County Police Chiefs, almost all of whom were left in their

positions by the civil administration, report every ten days to the leader of Einsatzkommando 2

and the Kommandeur of the Order Police on the political situation and on police activity in their

territory and at the same time receive their instructions. On September 12, the first workshop was

held with the County Police Chiefs in Riga. Organizational issues and guidelines for the treatment

of Jews and Communists were discussed in particular.

Because there is or will be established at the seat of every Gebietskommissariat a Security Police

and SD branch office, which is to handle the counties that belong to the Gebietskommissariat, the

guarantee is given that all important matters, especially the political-police matters, are handled

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 12

by German policemen.

The Schutzmannschaften will be paid from Reich funds.

Strength and distribution of the Latvian Auxiliary Police are shown in the overview attached as

Attachment 4.

Developments in Estonia were similar to those in Latvia. In Tallinn, the German Security Police

here, too, immediately established a great number of Estonian Auxiliary Police organs. In the

rural areas, it was possible to fall back on formations being spontaneously formed. After vetting

of the persons who had been recruited for Auxiliary Police service, a police prefecture was

established in Tallinn with 13 police precincts, a criminal police section, and a political section.

The task of the police precincts and the criminal police section is to maintain public order and

safety. The criminal police section is to pursue and work on all criminal offenses that become

known to it on its own, and to report all cases to the Security Police on an on-going basis.

In regard to substance, the political section of the police prefecture is directly subordinate to the

German Security Police. Its activity is to be limited to manhunts, arrests, and interrogations as

well as to collecting evidence. After this work is completed, the files are to be submitted to the

Einsatzkommando together with a recommended decision.

Moreover, the political section

conducts all vetting of personnel who are employed or are being considered for employment in

economic enterprises. The results of the vetting are presented to the Einsatzkommando for a

decision.

The Self-Protection Force was established in addition to the Auxiliary Police. The Self-Protection

Force was organized into Hundreds under the leadership of former Estonian Army officers and

reliable Estonians.

The Self-Protection formations are deployed to carry out executions. An additional task of theirs

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 13

is suppression of scattered Red Army soldiers and partisan groups, which continue to surface in

Estonia. They have also been put in charge of guarding enterprises vital to the war effort, bridges,

storage facilities, and other locations at risk of sabotage. For prisoner transports, the SelfProtection Force furnishes guard units.

2.

Reconstruction of the Prison System

The jails in the Baltic countries were found to be either completely empty or filled with Jews and

Communists who had been seized by the Self-Protection forces.

During their withdrawal, the Bolsheviks either murdered the prisoners or kidnapped them. The

prison personnel had generally fled with the Russians.

Since there were no national judicial administrations for the time being, and since German courts

will be installed only after the German Civil Administration has been established, the jails,

regardless of their erstwhile purpose, were all initially placed under the police administration.

The personnel for prison service are provided by the Self-Protection forces and the Auxiliary

Police forces.

Insofar as the reception capacity of the detention spaces did not suffice, provisional concentration

camps were established. The preparations for erecting larger concentration camps are underway.

The tables in Attachment 5 show the current figures of the prison population.

II.

Cleansing and Securing the Deployment Area

1.

The Initiation of Self-Cleansing Operations

Considering that the population of the Baltic countries had suffered most heavily under the rule of

Bolshevism and Judaism during the period of their integration into the USSR, it could be expected

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 14

that after their liberation from this foreign domination, they would largely neutralize the opponents

who remained in the country after the retreat of the Red Army. It had to be the task of the Security

Police to initiate and properly channel these self-cleansing efforts, in order to attain the goal

established for cleansing the area as quickly as possible. It was no less important to establish for

the future the firm and demonstrable fact that the liberated population had, on its own accord,

undertaken the harshest measures against the Bolshevik and Jewish enemy, without instructions

from German agencies being identifiable.

In Lithuania this was accomplished first in Kaunas by deploying partisans. Surprisingly, it was

not easy at first to initiate a large-scale Jewish pogrom there. The aforementioned partisan

group’s leader, Klimaitis, who was one of the first called upon in this regard, succeeded in

initiating a pogrom on the basis of hints given to him by a small advance detachment deployed in

Kaunas, without any visible indication to the outside world of a German order or of German

prompting. During the first pogrom during the night of June 25 to 26, more than 1,500 Jews were

eliminated by the Lithuanian partisans, several synagogues were set on fire or otherwise destroyed,

and a Jewish residential area with approximately 60 houses was also burned down. During the

following nights, 2,300 Jews were neutralized in the same manner. In other parts of Lithuania

similar operations took place following the example set in Kaunas, albeit on a smaller scale, and

these also extended to Communists who had stayed behind.

The self-cleansing operations ran smoothly due to the instructions of the Wehrmacht offices, which

had a thorough understanding of this course of action. In this, it was clear from the outset that

only the first few days of the occupation would provide the opportunity for carrying out pogroms.

After the disarming of the partisans, the self-cleansing operations ceased.

It was significantly more difficult to set similar cleansing operations and pogroms into motion in

Latvia. This could be traced to the fact that the entire stratum of national leadership, especially

in Riga, had been murdered or abducted by the Soviets. After exerting influence to this effect on

the Latvian Auxiliary Police, however, it was possible to initiate a Jewish pogrom in Riga as well,

in the course of which all synagogues were destroyed and approximately 400 Jews were killed.

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 15

Since the general pacification of the population in Riga occurred very quickly, further pogroms

were no longer viable.

As far as possible, films and photographs recorded the fact that the first spontaneous executions

of Jews and Communists in both Kaunas and in Riga were conducted by Lithuanians and Latvians.

There was no possibility of initiating pogroms in Estonia in view of the relatively small number

of Jews. The Estonian Self-Protection forces merely eliminated particularly hated Communists

in a few cases but generally limited their activity to conducting arrest operations.

2.

Suppression of Communism

The main priority in the work of the Security Police in all sectors of the deployment area was the

suppression of Communism and of Jewry.

Soviet civil servants and the Soviet functionaries of the Communist Party had fled with the Soviet

Army. Given their experiences of more than a year under despotic Bolshevik rule, the population

of the Baltic countries recognized the necessity of also eliminating the remnants of Communism

left behind after the Red Army had retreated. This basic attitude made the cleansing work of the

Security Police in this area significantly easier, particularly since active nationalist circles, i.e., the

partisans in Lithuania and the Self-Protection forces in Latvia and Estonia, cooperated in this

cleansing.

a.

Securing of Materials

The Security Police measures to be carried out in this area of work were essentially the same in all

of the Baltic countries. First, the Sonderkommandos occupied and searched the most important

buildings of the Communist Party and its auxiliary organizations, the editorial offices of the

Communist press, the offices of vocational organizations, and the residences of leading

Communist functionaries who had fled. This work, which was undertaken everywhere by the

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 16

Sonderkommandos before the arrival of the collection detachments of the Counterintelligence

Department of the OKW [i.e., the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, the High Command of the

Armed Forces], was continued by the main detachments and expanded to all buildings in which

any material was suspected. The securing of the material was frequently made difficult by the

fact that Self-Protection forces had conducted searches in the most important buildings on their

own and had attempted to carry off material, which subsequently had to be brought back. In spite

of the hasty Russian retreat, the major part of the documents and card-file materials from almost

all Communist Party and state-owned buildings was either destroyed by the Russians or taken

away. Without exception, the communications equipment had been destroyed.

The careful perusal and processing of the left-behind material nevertheless produced an abundance

of valuable information. Initially, evaluation of the material was geared mainly toward gathering

evidence for seizing and eliminating the remaining prominent Communists. Numerous lists of

names provided valuable information, which was supplemented by questioning informants and by

piecing together reports and denunciations by the general public.

There was also some material found for future research on Communism. As far as the work load

has permitted, this has already been evaluated. At this time an attempt is being made to gain as

exact a view as possible of the organizational structure and working procedure of the Soviet

agencies, especially of the GPU [i.e., the Glavnoe Politicheskoe Upravlenie, or “Main Political

Directorate”].

The material seized and evaluated in Latvia, particularly in Riga, by

Einsatzkommando 2 gives a fairly precise overview. A special report covering this material is

attached as Attachment 6 [not included here]. The material which has been evaluated to date in

Estonia, supplemented by the testimony of arrested leading functionaries, provides an overview of

the organization of the highest agencies and offices of the Estonian Socialist Soviet Republic. See

Attachment 7 [not included here] for an overview sketch which also provides an indication of the

importance of the arrested functionaries.

quantities.

Communist propaganda material was seized in large

Whenever the seized documents, especially card files, Soviet Russian training

regulations, and official directives, were chiefly of military importance, they were handed over

immediately to Counterintelligence or to other pertinent military offices.

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 17

b.

Manhunts and Arrests of Communists

In addition to the search actions, a systematic manhunt was carried out for remaining Communist

functionaries, Red Army personnel, and those persons tainted more strongly by their work for

Communism. In some cases the Self-Protection forces had already spontaneously rendered

harmless the most notorious Communists.

In the larger cities large-scale operations were undertaken, in the course of which numerous arrests

and searches took place, with the involvement of all available personnel of the detachments and

all of the Self-Protection Forces, as well as with the support of the German Order Police.

After these highest priority tasks had been completed in the cities, cleansing in the rural areas was

undertaken by small partial detachments. In this task, too, the Self-Protection forces performed

valuable assistance. From some locations over distances of 150 kilometers, rural Self-Protection

squads transported Communists caught in their area to the Einsatzkommandos.

The scope of the cleansing operation in the fight against Communism can be seen in the overview

of the number of executions, enclosed as Attachment 8.

c.

Suppression of Illegal Communist Work

In addition to conducting cleansing operations, particularly close attention went to all attempts at

the continuation of Communist activity. In the first days and weeks after the occupation there

were occasional nighttime surprise attacks on German posts and offices. The partial detachment

deployed at Liepāja, which was considered the “reddest” city in Latvia before and during the

Bolshevik period, conducted particularly successful counterintelligence work.

Isolated meetings of Communists took place, at which the taking up of illegal activity was

discussed. It was possible to seize a number of these groups and to eliminate them. A swift

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 18

reaction was all the more necessary, since it had to be assumed from the outset that the Bolsheviks

had left a large number of reliable followers behind to develop illegal work in the country. In

order also to render harmless this circle as comprehensively as possible, an ever expanding

network of informants was established. In this manner, it has been possible to obtain insight into

the existing terrorist organizations in Latvia, which consist mainly of Russians and whose plans

include liberating by armed force the Communists imprisoned at the Central Prison at Riga. Eight

members of this organization have already been arrested. At the moment, investigations are being

conducted into a larger organization, the so-called “Territorial Corps for the Liberation of Latvia.”

This corps was organized in Gorky [today: Nizhny Novgorod] and is said to consist of two groups

of 120 men. One part of this corps is working in Riga and currently limits itself to reconnoitering

opportunities for sabotage.

It is alleged that this organization also has already started its activity in the provincial areas. The

leader of this corps is a Communist functionary sent from Moscow. At the appropriate moment,

this organization, which continues to be infiltrated by informants, will be rendered harmless.

Apart from the occasional distribution of agitation leaflets, in which the population is urged to

resist the occupation troops and to persevere, no active Communist sedition has been found in

Latvia to date. It can be assumed with reasonable certainty that Latvia has been essentially purged

of active Communists. This becomes clear from the fact, among other things, that the number of

incidents of sabotage, damage to military materiel, and arson is exceedingly small.

With regard to illegal work being performed in Estonia, it was ascertained that the party leadership

in Moscow had ordered the Central Committees of the Federal Republics at the end of July to leave

suitable party members behind in the areas occupied by the Germans, in order to form groups to

work illegally and in particular to organize partisan warfare. They initially were to hide in Tallinn

for a few weeks and then commence with the creation of the illegal party organization. The early

arrest of the seven most important functionaries and the flight of numerous Communists, who

would have been considered for enlistment, prevented the formation of a central party organization

in Estonia. During their interrogation, the arrested persons stated uniformly that they had not yet

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 19

initiated contact with anyone. The importance of the arrested top functionaries is shown in the

overview of the former highest Soviet authorities in Estonia, attached as Attachment 7 [not

included here].

Some terrorist groups that were supposed to commit acts of sabotage and terrorism across the

entire country have been arrested in the county of Tartu. So far, apart from the destruction of a

few cables and one fire in Tallinn, there have been no acts of sabotage in Estonia. Extensive

manhunts are currently in progress based on the statements made by the arrested functionaries.

3.

Suppression of Jewry.

From the very beginning it was to be expected that pogroms alone would not solve the Jewish

problem in the Ostland. On the other hand, in accordance with the fundamental orders, the goal

of the cleansing operation of the Security Police was as comprehensive an elimination of Jews as

possible. Thus, Sonderkommandos that were selectively augmented – in Lithuania, with partisan

troops; in Latvia, with troops of the Latvian Auxiliary Police – conducted major executions in the

cities and rural areas. The use of execution detachments went smoothly. When Lithuanian and

Latvian personnel were allocated to the execution detachments, particular attention was paid to

choosing men whose family members or relatives had been murdered or abducted by the Russians.

Particularly tough and extensive operations had to be undertaken in Lithuania. In some

parts, especially in Kaunas, the Jews had armed themselves and were participating actively in

sniper warfare and arson. Furthermore, the Jews in Lithuania had worked hand-in-hand with the

Soviets in a particularly active manner.

The total number of Jews liquidated in Lithuania amounts to 71,105.

During the pogroms in Kaunas, 3,800 Jews were eliminated; in the smaller cities approximately

1,200.

In Latvia, as well, the Jews participated as saboteurs and arsonists after the arrival of the

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 20

Wehrmacht. In Daugavpils, Jews set so many fires that a large part of the city fell victim to them.

The power plant burned down completely. The residential streets primarily occupied by Jews

remained undamaged.

Up to now, a total of 30,000 Jews have been executed in Latvia. Five hundred were rendered

harmless by the pogroms in Riga.

Most of the 4,500 Jews who lived in Estonia at the beginning of the Eastern Campaign fled during

the retreat of the Red Army. Approximately two thousand remained. Almost one thousand Jews

lived in Tallinn alone.

The arrest of all male Jews over 16 years old has almost been completed. With the exception of

medical doctors and Jewish elders appointed by the Sonderkommandos, they are being executed

by the Estonian Self-Defense Force under the supervision of Sonderkommando la. The ablebodied Jewesses living in Tallinn and Pärnu between the ages of 16 and 60 were taken into custody

and employed to cut peat and to perform other tasks.

In Harku a camp is currently being constructed to which all Estonian Jews will be sent, with the

result that Estonia will soon be free of Jews.

As soon as the first large-scale executions in Lithuania and Latvia had been carried out, it became

clear that a complete extermination of the Jews is not possible, at least not at this time. Since

most of the skilled occupations in Lithuania and Latvia are in the hands of Jews, and since some

trades are almost exclusively practiced by Jews (especially glaziers, plumbers, stove-fitters,

cobblers), a large number of Jewish craftsmen are indispensable at this time for the repair of vital

installations, for the reconstruction of destroyed cities, and for work vital to the war. Even though

economic enterprises are making an effort to replace Jewish workers with Lithuanian and Latvian

workers, an immediate discharge of all of the Jewish workmen in the labor force is not yet possible,

particularly not in the large cities. On the other hand, in cooperation with the employment offices,

all Jews who at this time are no longer capable of work are being rounded up and will soon be

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 21

executed in small operations.

In this connection should be mentioned the sometimes considerable resistance by offices of the

Civil Administration to the implementation of large-scale executions. This was countered in all

cases by pointing out that it was a matter of carrying out fundamental orders.

In addition to organizing and implementing executions, the creation of ghettos in the larger cities

was immediately started during the first few days of deployment. This was particularly urgent in

Kaunas, since 30,000 Jews lived there, among a total population of 152,400. For this reason, after

the first pogroms had taken place, a Jewish Committee was summoned and informed that the

German offices had had no reason until that time to intervene in the conflicts between Lithuanians

and Jews. A prerequisite to achieving normal conditions would initially be the establishment of

a Jewish ghetto. When the Jewish Committee raised objections, they were told that otherwise

there would be no possibility of preventing further pogroms. Thereupon, the Jews immediately

declared themselves ready to do everything to re-settle their fellow Jews with the utmost speed to

that part of the city, called Vilijampole, which was designated a Jewish ghetto. This part of the

city is located in the triangle created by the Neman on one side and a tributary on the other; it is

connected to Kaunas by only one bridge and is therefore easy to block off.

In Riga the so-called “Moscow Suburb” was designated as a ghetto.

This is Riga’s worst

residential area, which was primarily inhabited by Jews. The assigning of Jews to the ghetto

district was fairly difficult because the Latvians still living there had to be moved out, and living

space in Riga is very scarce. Of the 28,000 Jews remaining in Riga, 24,000 have thus far been

housed in the ghetto. The Security Police limited its activities solely to police tasks during the

creation of the ghettos. The establishment and the administration of the ghettos as well as the

regulation of rations for the inhabitants were left up to the Civil Administration, and the labor

allocation of the inmates was left to the discretion of the employment offices.

Ghettos are also being established in the rest of the cities where large numbers of Jews reside.

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 22

The distinctive marking of Jews by means of a yellow Star of David on the chest and on the back,

which had been initially directed by provisional Security Police orders, has been quickly

implemented based on orders to this effect from the Commander of the Army Group Rear Area

and later from the Civil Administration.

The number of Jews liquidated to date is shown in the list in Attachment 8.

4.

Suppression of Partisans

During the first weeks of the war, the Soviets set up partisan regiments which had the mission of

perpetrating acts of sabotage behind the German lines and far into the Army Group Rear Area and

of creating discord in every imaginable way through ambushes and acts of terrorism. In addition

to these units sent through the German lines, partisan groups came together out of Communists

that had been left behind and scattered Red Army soldiers, and they became active in the same

manner. Furthermore, in various areas partisans were inserted as parachutists.

After various parts of the area to be cleansed had been systematically combed through by the

Einsatzkommandos of the Security Police and by the Wehrmacht, it very soon became obvious

from the experiences they gathered that suppression of the partisans would only be successful if it

were based on intelligence. Since creating an intelligence network alone is insufficient, the

Latvian interpreter troops who had been assigned to the Kommandos were used as civilian scouts.

In this way, there was a steady increase in the success rate of tracking down partisans. In some

areas, our own personnel were deployed to eliminate the partisan troops. Whenever necessary,

larger operations were conducted in cooperation with Wehrmacht units. The intelligence network

was extended in such a way that the local garrisons and regional garrisons [Feldkommandaturen]

have now taken over the mission of intelligence filter centers, passing the reports to the appropriate

troop units. A great deal of information was gathered in actual partisan suppression. Over time,

the interrogation of imprisoned members of the partisan units and other prisoners has resulted in a

fairly complete picture of the composition, missions, and tactics of the partisans.

This

information has been carefully evaluated and written up in the form of situation reports as

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 23

requested by the armies. Copies of the latest situation reports are attached in Attachment 9.

5.

1).

Other Security Police Work.

Occasionally, conditions at mental hospitals necessitated Security Police measures.

Numerous institutions were robbed of all their rations by the retreating Russians. Many

of the guards and nursing personnel had fled. Since the inmates were breaking out of

various institutions and becoming a threat to security, the following were liquidated:

in Aglona (Lithuania)

544 mental patients

in Marijampole (Lithuania)

109 mental patients

and in Mogutovo (near Luga)

95 mental patients

TOTAL

748 mental patients

In some cases, Wehrmacht offices requested that other institutions which were needed for

troop quarters be cleaned out in the same manner. Since Security Police interests did not

require intervention in these cases, it was left to the Wehrmacht offices to implement the

measures they deemed necessary with their own personnel.

2)

The Einsatzkommandos initiated large-scale investigations concerning abducted persons,

as well as the exhumation and identification of persons who had been murdered by the

Bolsheviks. For propaganda reasons, the Wehrmacht propaganda squads and in some

instances also the foreign press were involved.

In Estonia the exhumation of Estonians murdered by the Russians was organized on a large

scale. Because of the scope of this work, a central office has been set up in Tallinn under

the supervision of the Security Police to search systematically for abducted or murdered

persons.

The extent of this work is shown by the fact that 30,000 men have been reported missing

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 24

from Tallinn alone.

III.

Counterespionage

The network of the British, French, and American intelligence services that had been created in

the Baltic countries was destroyed as a result of the flight or elimination of the agents. The last

remnants will be rendered harmless by the currently occurring investigative work. In Lithuania

to date, 28 persons have been arrested for suspected espionage. Of these, seven were handed over

to the Gestapo offices in Königsberg and Tilsit. At the moment, the remaining cases have not yet

been conclusively processed.

In Latvia, 11 persons were arrested for espionage.

In 25 additional cases preliminary

investigations are underway.

It is to be expected that the enemy intelligence network, particularly the British network, will

attempt to resume its activity in the near future, in order to set up sabotage organizations and

opportunities to incite the public in the occupied countries, along with espionage activities. The

building up of an extensive network of informants and further close cooperation with

counterintelligence offices will counter these attempts to the extent possible, given the small

number of available personnel trained in counterintelligence work.

IV.

Vetting of Personnel and Card-File Matters

The vetting of personnel concerning their political reliability is constantly taking on greater

proportions. Apart from the vetting of personnel employed by the authorities, vetting is underway

of personnel employed in the most important workshops. The Auxiliary Police is providing

valuable assistance in the gathering of this information. Because the setting up of a card file of

persons who have appeared in a politically negative light was taken up right at the beginning of

the work and has been systematically continued, there are already 23,000 persons included in this

card file in Latvia. The card file in Lithuania includes more than 10,000 cards so far.

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 25

V.

The Work of the Criminal Police

After the incorporation of the Baltic states into the USSR, criminal police work was taken over by

the Red “Militia Administration.” The former leaders of criminal police offices were all either

relieved of their duties or imprisoned or murdered. The other officials were likewise gradually

discharged, sent away, or imprisoned, and were replaced by Jews or functionaries sent from

Russia.

Before fleeing, the Soviet officials destroyed or carried off not only the documents concerning

their own criminal police work, but also those card catalogs and files which had been taken over

from the former criminal police.

The heavy demand on the Einsatzkommandos in the pacification and cleansing operations during

the first weeks and months made it impossible to utilize their own personnel to any great extent to

carry out criminal police tasks. Therefore, during the process of setting up the Auxiliary Police,

special emphasis was placed on establishing a new criminal police network consisting of local

personnel. At first, prefects and county police chiefs were appointed, and they brought in former

members of the criminal police and other suitable personnel. Careful vetting of personnel and

very extensive supervision of the activities of these offices ensured that the work would proceed

according to guidelines laid down by the German Security Police. Basically, in the criminal

police offices of the Baltic countries, the following system was established: The local criminal

police offices report daily to the Einsatzkommandos or to the local partial detachments and branch

offices on their activities and on the arrests and searches carried out. After an initial determination

of the facts, insofar as the cases concern criminal acts in which German military or civilian

personnel were involved or harmed, the further handling of the matter is taken over by the German

Security Police.

After the process of setting up criminal police offices is completed, the

establishment of a tightly-organized criminal police network will be undertaken.

Furthermore, integration of the local fugitive investigations apparatus into that of the Reich must

be achieved. Samples of pre-printed forms used in the card-file system and fugitives apparatus

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 26

have been requested from Office V. Furthermore, there is work currently underway to organize

a crime prevention campaign, something unknown in this area until now. Before the prevention

measures are introduced, in order to clear up the most serious cases, the professional criminals will

be taken over by the Einsatzkommandos and, if the situation seems to warrant it, executed.

All the files of the Criminal Police in Lithuania were carried off by the Bolsheviks, but some of

the materials were later found in Vilnius and handed over to the Lithuanian Criminal Police. Both

the police registration system and the fugitives apparatus were set in motion in accordance with

instructions given by Einsatzkommando 3. The number of serious crimes which have come to

the attention of the Lithuanian Criminal Police is very small. The largest workload is reported by

the Burglary Section. In Kaunas, special measures had to be taken in the policing of vice. In

order to prevent the further spread of venereal diseases, which are especially prevalent in Kaunas,

necessary measures were taken, in cooperation with the field garrison. Patrols and raids are

constantly being conducted in parks, hotels, and cafés, primarily to gather up prostitutes suffering

from venereal disease.

The most progress has been made in setting up the criminal police in Latvia. During their retreat,

the Russians left behind here only the penal card catalog kept since 1914, destroying all other files

and forensic technical equipment. The staffing and organization of the Latvian Criminal Police

can be seen in the survey attached as Attachment 10. The activity survey, likewise enclosed, as

Attachment 11, shows the extent of crime and the successes of the Latvian Criminal Police for the

months of July through September 1941.

In Estonia, too, the setting up of the criminal police has mostly been completed.

Attachment 12.)

(See

The resumption of the work of the criminal police in Estonia was made

particularly difficult by the fact that the Russians, during their retreat, destroyed or carried off all

card catalogs and files. Criminality in Estonia is extremely low. It is remarkable, for example,

that in a period of six weeks, only one case of grand larceny was processed in Tallinn. Looting

and armed robberies have not been reported at all. The Estonian Criminal Police was extensively

used in the investigation and identification of Estonians murdered by the Russians.

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 27

B.

The Old Russian Territory and White Ruthenia

By the nature of things, conditions in White Ruthenia and in the old Russian territory belonging to

the area of Einsatzgruppe A were substantially different from those in the Baltic area. Therefore,

the work of the Security Police had to be conducted in an entirely different context.

No indigenous police forces of any kind were present anywhere in the old Russian area; hence,

pacification had to be carried out by our own forces. The Russian part of the operations area is

extremely vast and sparsely populated. With the exception of Pskov, Luga, and Novgorod, there

are no major cities. These three largely destroyed cities were overhauled in the usual manner.

The number of important Jews and Communists who had stayed behind was nevertheless relatively

small. Even in the smaller towns and villages, most Communist functionaries had fled in time.

Anti-partisan suppression comprised the bulk of the work done by the Security Police in this part

of the operations area (cf. above, under A II, 4).

Since Einsatzgruppe B was previously responsible for White Ruthenia and the area has only

recently been taken over, reference will be made to the reports submitted by Einsatzgruppe B.

Currently, the first large-scale cleansing operations are underway. Einsatzgruppe B liquidated

7,620 Jews in Barysaw. The Communists who remained are unleashing strong activity. After

the necessary preliminaries have been completed, an extensive cleansing operation will take place

in this regard as well. The numerous partisan troops create considerable unrest in all parts of

White Ruthenia. The Wehrmacht units which to date have been deployed in anti-partisan combat

will be supported by the Einsatzkommandos of the Security Police, particularly with regard to the

establishment of an intelligence network.

Further extensive measures will be taken against Polish chauvinists, who are collaborating in an

extremely strong way with Jews and Communists against the Germans.

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 28

Criminal police work in White Ruthenia is being built up.

Since Wehrmacht offices have

recruited a large number of Poles as auxiliaries in the old Polish part of White Ruthenia, and since

it is politically untenable to incorporate Poles into auxiliary police activities, and since there are

very few White Ruthenian forces suitable for such service, the process of setting up criminal police

work there will be significantly slower than in the Baltic region.

Since there are no local police forces in the old Russian part of the operations area, all criminal

police work must be conducted by the Einsatzkommandos themselves. Criminal police work thus

is by the nature of things limited to executing perpetrators of serious crimes as well as habitual

criminals.

Overview of the Situation Prior to the Entry of German Troops

The area for which Einsatzgruppe A is responsible, to the extent that it overlaps with the territory

of the Reich Commissariat Ostland, can be divided historically and ethnically into two parts,

namely, the former Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia) and White Ruthenia. Historically, a

separation is necessary, since White Ruthenia belonged to the USSR ever since the Russian

Revolution, whereas the Baltic states were not incorporated into the Soviet Union until June 17,

1940, after external pressure was exerted. Concerning ethnicity, a separation seems in order, as

the nations of the Baltic states, especially the Latvians and Estonians, have a high proportion of

Nordic blood, whereas the population of White Ruthenia is mostly Eastern in origin.

Before June 17, 1940, the Baltic states had aligned themselves not only politically but also

economically and culturally with the western European states. Their foreign policy took an

emphatically pro-British course, in which Latvia was the primary driving force; it was completely

under the influence of the Freemasons and other Jewish-plutocratic organizations. The antiGerman attitude was intensified by skillful propaganda and was supported by the thought that the

Baltic states owed their independence to the British and French. There was, moreover, the idea

that only the close relationship with England and its support could have brought about such a high

cultural and social level and such outstanding economic success. To strengthen this policy,

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 29

English- and French-language schools were established, particularly in Latvia, which introduced

the two languages as major subjects in middle school; anti-German motion pictures were filmed;

and, finally, historical development was portrayed in such a manner that it obliged people to feel

gratitude towards England.

The standard of living and the cultural level were relatively high, especially in Estonia and Latvia.

Blue-collar workers lived in good economic circumstances and were able to lead a carefree

existence on an average yearly income of 1,674 Lats (Latvia). The average yearly income of a

white-collar worker was 2,921 Lats (Latvia) and was consumed according to the following index:

blue-collar worker

white-collar worker

Food

42%

30%

Clothing

13%

14%

Housing

15%

15%

Miscellaneous

30%

41%

From the high percentage of the figure indexed as “miscellaneous” one can see that a blue-collar

worker could spend almost one-third of his salary on non-essential items, and a white-collar

employee had almost half of his salary to spend on non-essential items.

Social-welfare legislation included support for widows, orphans, and accident victims; a special

law granted recuperative leave and vacation to the worker; and, finally, the health insurance system

was organized in an almost exemplary way. Access to doctors was adequate in urban and rural

areas, and the state health service likewise was able to cope with the demands made on it. In

Latvia, for instance, there were three state-owned institutions for infants, several children’s homes,

and 84 kindergartens; in addition, cribs and other necessities for infants were provided free of

charge to needy mothers; and families with many children received special support. At the same

time, the Baltic states had pension laws and available welfare budgets for the care of the needy

who were not eligible for pensions.

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 30

The school system, which was in a totally undeveloped state immediately after the world war, was

brought to a level conforming to the cultural level of the western countries in the following twenty

years. There were only a few illiterates in Lithuania. The number of parochial institutions of

learning was relatively high. In Latvia, for example, there was a total of 108 such schools with

14,715 pupils, contrasted to 77 middle schools with 17,052 pupils. Universities were located in

Tartu, Riga, and Kaunas.

The arts as well as the rest of cultural life were primarily under Jewish influence, especially in

Latvia and Lithuania.

The press was well-developed and in part even overdeveloped, which becomes evident from the

number of 186 newspapers and magazines for a population of two million Latvians.

Economically, the Baltic states are primarily agriculturally oriented. All three states had strong

agriculture and highly developed animal husbandry.

Only a portion of the products were

consumed domestically; butter, eggs, cheese, and preserved meats were prime exports. The

number of foreign farm workers was high only in Lithuania, which was due to the very large

percentage of Poles already living there. In 1939 Latvia needed only 12,000 Poles and only

slightly more than 20,000 Russians for its agriculture. The intensification of soil cultivation,

however, does not approach anywhere near that of Germany; hence, productivity per hectare was

as much as 50% less than that in the German Reich.

The use of artificial fertilizers,

mechanization, and motorization also leaves a great deal to be desired, with the result that the

number of employed workers is disproportionate to the actual yield.

Industry plays a certain role in Estonia. Oil shale is the main mineral resource. Another reason

for the relatively large-scale development of Estonian industry can be found in the Estonians’

materialistic way of thinking, since the most income can be earned in this sector. Apart from the

oil shale industry, also worth mentioning are a cement factory, important lumber and cellulose

factories, and well-developed provisioning of foodstuffs and electric power.

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 31

In Latvia, approximately 14% of the population was employed in industry in 1935. Especially

well-developed industrial sectors were the wood and paper industries, the foodstuffs plants, and

the flax industry. Trade has always been an important factor as a result of the Baltic states’

geopolitical position. In Latvia, approximately 10% of the population was employed in 37,830

commercial enterprises.

A large number of these businesses was state-owned, commercial

enterprises, especially in the grocery sector and the other goods needed for daily life. The

situation was similar in Lithuania, where the distribution of agricultural products was the

responsibility of a state-supervised cooperative (Pieno Centras).

The financial situation of the three states corresponded to their respective national wealth; Latvia

and Estonia had balanced budgets, while Lithuania was obliged to take out loans occasionally. In

Latvia, almost 60% of the tax revenues of 112 million Lats in the year 1938-1939 came from

indirect taxes. Tobacco products, sugar, and brandy were taxed most heavily, at a rate of 60% of

the sales price, followed by yeast at 40%, beer at 30%, and then textiles and salt. Direct taxes,

such as income taxes, real-estate taxes, and sales taxes, comprised approximately 13% of state

revenue. The remainder of state revenue consisted of monies collected from state enterprises and

other state participation in the economy. Total state revenue during the fiscal year 1938-1939

amounted to more than 20% of the national income of Latvia.

The policies pursued by the Baltic states had to lead to catastrophe the moment that war

developments eliminated the western powers from the Baltic region and a “political armistice”

between Germany and Russia was created in the form of the Autumn Pact of 1939. All of a

sudden, the Baltic nations found themselves alone, in a situation that with merciless brutality

showed them how far removed from reality they had been in their policy; and, conscious of their

own impotence, they yielded without resistance to Russia’s grasp. The year of Bolshevik rule has

created in the masses of the Baltic nations the preconditions for the recognition that it is impossible

for them to maintain themselves in the European cultural sphere without the protection of a great

power. Given present as well as historical developments, this power could only be the German

Reich.

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 32

From the first day of its rule in the Baltic countries, the Soviet state pursued the goal of

Bolshevizing the country in a forcible manner, if necessary through brutal means. The most

incisive measures concerned private property. First of all, all land property was nationalized and

thus declared to be the property of the state. The previously independent farmers were gathered

into collective farms and received for their labor a wage corresponding to the number of days

worked, a wage bearing no relation to that which they had previously earned. The well-to-do

class of farmers, those who had owned 50 to 60 hectares of land, had to relinquish any area in

excess of 30 hectares to so-called young farmers, who were selected solely on the principle of

party membership and who, in most cases, had no agricultural experience whatsoever. In Latvia,

for example, the land so divided amounted to over 50% of the farmland and affected more than

40,000 farms. More than 50,000 new farms were established. As a result of this division, a large

number of the hitherto viable farms were torn apart to such a degree that the old farmer was left

with hardly any buildings and no inventory, while the new farmer, because of the small land area

of 10 hectares allotted to him, could neither maintain nor utilize the buildings and inventory. As

a result, neither farm was viable, since the old farmer was unable to farm his land intensively,

lacking machinery and livestock, while the young farmer was totally in debt in order to maintain

the large buildings. A further blow to agriculture was the fact that 4,500 farmers were either

arrested or abducted.

The inventory of livestock was also drastically decimated when

approximately 20% of the workhorses, 20% of the cattle, 15% of the hogs, and 40% of the sheep

were carried off.

Similar expropriation measures in industry led to price increases on the one hand and to a reduction

in production on the other. By 1940, all industrial enterprises had been nationalized, whereby the

mere fact that a business organization was listed in the official Nationalization Index sufficed to

expropriate it. In the time that followed, medium-sized and even the smallest craftsman shops

were expropriated through additional decrees. A special burden was created by the fact that only

the assets were taken over, while all debts, including current year taxes and rents, had to be paid

by the former owner. This circumstance led in all cases to the additional loss of all the personal

property of the businessmen, with the result that they were deprived of any livelihood and left

penniless on the street.

The nationalized private enterprises were combined as “socialist

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 33

enterprises” into special administrative units, so-called trusts, while the craftsman shops and small

workshops were combined into so-called industrial collectives. The reorganized economy was a

clumsy, heavily bureaucratic apparatus, which dictated down to minute detail the measures that

had to be taken by the workshops. These measures deprived the supervisors and the workers of

all initiative and pleasure in their work.

Another factor that impaired and weakened the pleasure of work and the incentive to work was the

regulation of wages. The remuneration was neither according to knowledge and ability of the

individual, nor according to the responsibility and importance of the respective position, but was

determined schematically by Bolshevik principles.

According to this scale, for example, a

licensed physician received 30.-- Reichsmarks [i.e., per month]. After 10 years of practice his

income was raised to 40.-- Reichsmarks. On the other hand, an unskilled truck driver earned at

least that much, if not more. To the extent that they were subject to the Soviet wage scale, the

salaries of industrial managers, high state officials, and scientists were just as low.

The situation developed similarly in commerce and transportation.

Of the 38,000 existing

commercial enterprises in Latvia, for example, over 20,000 were nationalized at the beginning of

1941. As a result, there was a lack of shops, which had particularly negative effects on the

distribution of food and led to unpleasantly long lines in front of grocery stores. Even though

great efforts have been made, the lines have still not entirely disappeared to this day.

Less drastic but likewise of great importance for the life of the Baltic peoples were the changes

introduced by the Soviet regime in the social welfare, cultural, and financial areas. Most of the

social welfare laws were revoked, and the welfare agencies were dissolved, with only a small

number being reorganized according to the Bolshevik model.

Maternity benefits and birth

allowances were drastically cut, and medical insurance subsidies for medications were no longer

paid. The retirement laws were aligned with the Soviet-Russian model, according to which the

highest pension comes to 150 rubles; the average pension was reduced to between 80 and 100

rubles.

Going beyond this, the majority of high-ranking Latvian white-collar workers and

government officials eligible for retirement pensions were crossed off the pension list.

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 34

Bolshevism brought about a complete reorganization in educational affairs. The educational

system was changed: instead of the former 12 years of education, school now lasted only 10

years; and in the elementary schools four years were now sufficient instead of the seven years

formerly required.

The most important part of the curriculum was so-called “Marxist

interpretation.” The stamp of Marxism-Leninism was put on every lesson and was to be heard in

each word the teacher said. A further disruption of the educational system was created by the

Communist Pioneer and Youth Organizations, which were formed in all schools. The leader of

the Communist Youth Organization was simultaneously the ideological leader of the school.

Through this organization, allied with a pupils’ self-governing committee, a cunning system of

informants was built up even in the schools, from which neither teachers nor pupils were safe. An

enormous number of pupils and teachers were abducted as a result of being reported by this

organization – in Latvia, for example, a total of some 4,000 pupils and more than 400 teachers,

according to the official Red Cross figures of September 15, 1941. There was a plan, which was,

however, not carried out, to place 17,000 boys in so-called factory schools, where they were to be

trained in six months to be workers and technicians.

The Bolsheviks paid special attention to the theater and the press. Even though a number of

theaters closed after the arrival of the Bolsheviks, the number of theater personnel on average

doubled. Produced were almost exclusively Communist pieces with a pronounced propaganda

character. Those classics that were occasionally produced were textually “corrected” in a Marxist

sense. There was a similar development in the press, which was completely controlled by

Moscow. All managing positions were occupied by Bolsheviks, most of whom had been brought

from Russia. All newspapers and magazines were turned into Communist mouthpieces. New

publications on the book market consisted solely of translations of Russian works with marked

Communist tendencies.

The tax system of the Soviet Union, which took effect immediately after the Russians invaded, has

two primary taxes: (1) the sales tax, amounting to approximately 60% of entire tax revenue; and

(2) the revenue tax on state enterprises, amounting to approximately 15% of the government

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 35

budget revenue. Both taxes are in essence consumer taxes. With their assistance, the price

difference between the cost of production and the officially regulated sales price is transferred to

the tax fund. The primary proceeds of the consumer tax come mainly from bread, for which the

sales price was 90% above the cost of production. Since the Soviet tax system is completely

centralized, and since only one state budget for the entire territory of the USSR is drawn up, the

economic differences among the three Baltic states could not be taken into account; thus,

Lithuania, for example, had the same tax laws as Latvia, although Latvia with a smaller population

has more than twice as much industry.

As a result of these differences, Soviet tax laws

encountered such great difficulties that only a small part could be implemented.

Soviet government in the Baltic states was maintained by a blatant reign of terror, under which

any resistance was immediately nipped in the bud by the most brutal methods. An intricately

developed espionage and informant system, which covered the entire country and was maintained

by means of blackmail and bribery, ensured that no resistance movement was able to gain a

foothold. Anyone who criticized the Bolshevik state leadership or Communist ideology was

immediately eliminated. During the course of a single year of Bolshevik rule, according to the

October 1, 1941, findings of the Latvian Red Cross, in the territory of the formerly sovereign state

of Latvia approximately 14,000 persons were abducted:

5,000 were arrested, and 9,000

disappeared.

No figures are available yet for the White Ruthenian area, since Einsatzgruppe A has only recently

taken over this area. The situation in White Ruthenia is discussed in a report by Einsatzgruppe

B, which until recently was responsible for the White Ruthenian operations area.

The Situation of the Aspects of Life

The area dealt with by Einsatzgruppe A includes the former sovereign states of Lithuania, Latvia,

and Estonia, the territory of White Ruthenia, including Minsk and Baranovichi, as well as the area

east of the Latvian-Estonian border up to the Valdai Hills, Lake Ilmen, and the suburbs of

Petersburg, areas that later will go to Latvia and Estonia. This area is ethnologically, historically,

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 36

and economically very diverse.

The three Baltic states and the area between Lake Peipus and Lake Ilmen were reached and dealt

with by Einsatzgruppe A at the same time as the arrival of the vanguard of the German troops.

Vilnius, Minsk, and Baranovichi were taken over later by the neighboring Einsatzgruppe.

At this time, the Civil Administration covers the Generalkommissariat of Lithuania including the

sovereign state of Lithuania and the Vilnius area; the Generalkommissariat of Latvia; and the

Generalkommissariat of White Ruthenia, including Minsk and Baranovichi. Estonia and the area

south of Lake Ilmen are still Army Rear Areas, and the area east of Lake Peipus and north of Lake

Ilmen is still an operational area. In general, it can be said for the whole area that the situation is

still very unclear and that the German administrative offices themselves have not been informed

about the form that future administration will take and the fate of the ethnic groups living in the

area.

Consequently, no purposeful work is being done in any of the administrative fields,

including the economic administration, and the measures taken and information given by the

various administrative offices are frequently highly contradictory. To the objective observer a

picture of disunity emerges: it is totally devoid of guidelines, and German administrative offices

and their personnel greatly lack preparation for their duties. This picture has not remained hidden

from the local population, either; and exclamations such as “The Germans know how to conquer,

but they don’t know how to govern” are not rare.

The most crucial drawbacks of this lack of clarity in the political leadership are: (1) in all

Generalkommissariats groups are being formed among the indigenous population which attach

themselves to specific administrative offices and try to play one office off against another; and (2)

the compliant workforce, that is undoubtedly available, especially among the high-quality peoples

of the Baltic states, is being splintered and is not being exploited in every respect, particularly in

the economy. The fact that the Reich Commissar for the Ostland is issuing directives concerning

purchase authorizations for felt shoes, etc., instead of the expected broad reconstruction measures,

has led to great disappointment in many circles and occasionally to scorn.

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 37

Even the regulations concerning rations for the population, setting of prices, etc., have seldom

achieved their intended purpose. Most importantly of all, the general quality of life for the

majority of the population has not changed to date.

A. The Situation in Lithuania

Since the population has in no way been enlightened as to its future fate, those who think in

national terms certainly still envision a future independent Lithuanian state with a certain

dependence on the Greater German Reich. There is no indication of any effort to bring the

Lithuanian people closer to the Germanic peoples nor of a vision of the future that does not include

sovereignty. The enthusiasm with which the German troops were greeted has by no means turned

into the opposite; on the contrary, the pro-German feelings of the majority of the Lithuanian

population are being stressed continuously, and without any doubt these feelings are sincere. The

attempts to exaggerate the part played by the Lithuanian population in the struggle for liberation

and to emphasize the importance of their insurrections for the swift implementation of the

operation are doubtlessly intended to fulfill a political purpose. The fact that approximately 4,000

Lithuanians were killed in the fight against Bolshevism is constantly being exploited. Among

nationalistic youth and among the remnants of the officer corps there is an honest desire to

participate actively in the war on the side of the German troops. They feel neglected compared

to other peoples, because they believe they have more right to participate in the fight against

Bolshevism than these others.

Active antisemitism, which quickly flared up after the occupation of Lithuania by German troops,

has not abated. The Lithuanians offer their services gladly and tirelessly for the implementation

of all measures against Jews, and even today they sometimes conduct such measures on their own

initiative.

No one has made any kind of attempt to harness the partially idle, actively nationalistic youth.

After national activists were banned, national organizations no longer exist. In the long run the

danger exists that these young people will again be driven to democratic views or will succumb to

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 38

other political influences that cannot be monitored.

The German administrative authorities of the Generalkommissariat of Lithuania almost never

make use of Lithuanian agencies, some of which still exist. Down to the lowest levels, the

administrative work is being handled by Germans themselves. The appointed general councils

which certainly could do administrative work under German supervision, are either sentenced to

idleness or, at best, occupied with doing translations. From Lithuanian officialdom comes the

recurring, obvious question: How is it that the German Reich is capable of providing so many

people so as to have the entire administration, down to the lowest ranks, carried out by Germans?

Meanwhile, classes have resumed in the elementary and middle schools of Lithuania. German

language classes have been made mandatory; in addition, there are well-attended German language

courses conducted during the evening hours in all larger cities. These language courses take place

in all three Baltic countries and are equally well attended everywhere. The radio stations likewise

give German language lessons.

The University of Kaunas no longer admits any students, and the German administration intends

it to carry on for only three more semesters before closing the university completely.

During the past winter semester, more than 4,000 persons studied at the two universities. The

teaching personnel consisted of approximately 250 persons. The University of Kaunas has

historically been a stronghold of national chauvinism, and particularly the humanities faculties

have been sources of anti-German sentiment. Furthermore, it is characteristic of Lithuanian

student youths that a significant percentage leave their studies unfinished and then furnish the

government with its lower-ranking civil service as semi-intellectuals, albeit with the aspirations of

university graduates.

Young people almost never entered the free economy, commerce, or

industry, because these areas lay almost exclusively in the hands of Jews. Therefore, an urgent

task of the future is to guide Lithuanian youth into commerce and industry and to steer them away

from a university education. For this reason special attention must be given to the development

of a vocational training system.

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 39

The humanities faculties should be completely shut down. There is a need, however, to keep the

medical faculties intact as well as some sections of the technology faculties. More than 80% of

the dentists were Jewish; more than 50% of the other medical doctors as well. Their absence leads

to an extraordinary shortage of doctors which cannot even begin to be compensated by moving

people in from the Reich.

The necessary development of Lithuania’s transportation network likewise requires schooled

personnel, meaning that the technology faculties must also be maintained. In light of the clearly

agricultural character of Lithuania, it is also necessary for the veterinary academy and the

agricultural college to remain open.

The closing of the two universities with the exception of the medical and technology faculties

would not cause any special reaction from the Lithuanian public, especially if it is given sufficient

notification of the employment potential in all of the rest of the free economy and if the same thing

occurs in Latvia and Estonia.

It is sometimes pointed out by the Lithuanian side that the closing of the universities could be

construed as a measure by Germany to deprive Lithuania of its own culture. To avoid this

impression, the establishment of an institute of Germanic philology could be considered, within

the framework of which Lithuanian philological research could also assume a relevant place. The

task of the Germanic philology institute would be especially the training of teaching personnel,

since even elementary school teachers would be required to attend a few semesters of the Germanic

philology institute.

The Lithuanian population in general expected the German administration to revoke immediately

everything the Bolsheviks had introduced in the way of laws, administrative and economic

measures, etc. A number of the Bolshevik laws had been repealed by the provisional Lithuanian

government that existed at the very beginning though never officially recognized. The German

administration now has legally and formally left the majority of the Soviet laws intact and has also

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 40

annulled decrees of the provisional Lithuanian government. The intelligent Lithuanian points out

that it is difficult to understand that on the one hand the Greater German Reich fights a life-anddeath battle against Bolshevism, its ideologies, and institutions, and on the other adopts the laws

and systems decreed by Bolshevism. With the support of enemy propaganda, which still finds its

way into the occupied area, the opinion is spread that Germany is not waging primarily an

ideological war, but rather a war of conquest.

The food situation in Lithuania is good in the rural areas; in the cities, however, it is extraordinarily

difficult for various reasons. The available means of transportation are far from adequate, and

there are too few distribution centers. Even with ration cards, rationed food can only be obtained

after hours of standing in line, and the morale of the population that is queued up in front of grocery

stores in the cities is extremely bad in regard to this problem. The long lines of people are the

source of destructive propaganda and rumor-mongering.

The increase in prices of agricultural products has not completely achieved its purpose. With the

earnings from his output, the farmer scarcely has an opportunity to make purchases, since he is

unable to obtain agricultural machines, clothing, or tools, etc. As is true in the entire area of

Einsatzgruppe A, the farmer is very inclined to barter and tries to exchange his products for other

goods.

The increase in prices of agricultural products makes the problem of the wage question

immediately relevant. Wages were raised across the board by 24.-- Reichsmarks per month; for

hourly wages, a special figure was calculated corresponding to this index. This solution to the

wage question has led to the situation that all permanently employed salaried employees,

especially the lowest-level white-collar employees, have a considerable advantage over blue-collar

workers on hourly wages. Formerly, the Soviets linked wages to the amount of goods produced

and thereby arrived at a certain base wage, which could, however, be easily exceeded by the

workers and in many instances could even be doubled or tripled. As a result, because of the wage

freeze which allowed them as regular income merely the basic wage established by the Soviets,

the blue-collar workers in most cases earned only about 80% and often less than half of what they

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 41

had earned under Russian rule. Many workers who were formerly employed full-time are now

employed only part-time and therefore do not attain their normal number of hours; consequently,

they never receive a supplement of 24.-- Reichsmarks. Since most of these workers are specially

trained skilled workers, they are in a worse position than the unskilled laborers, since the latter by

the nature of things are meeting their full number of hours. The Lithuanian Workers’ Union

justifiably points out that as a result of this wage policy they undeservedly are being treated worse

than other occupational groups, and they expect, if only for reasons of common justice, a change

in this area as soon as possible.

B. The Situation in Latvia:

The reorganization of the political situation in Estonia, where an Estonian self-administrative body

with extensive authority is successfully working under the leadership of Dr. Mäe, gradually

became known in Latvia.

Automatically, comparisons are therefore being drawn with the

political situation in Latvia, and one does not understand why Estonians and Latvians are

experiencing such different treatment.

The less favorable position of Latvians has led to

considerable unrest among the Latvian population. In addition, this unrest is being fueled by a

number of events which are seen as a further dismantling of the remaining Latvian selfadministration. Of concern here is not only the unfortunate situation of the General Directorate

for Internal Administration and Personnel Issues under the leadership of General [Oskars]

Dankers, but also those Latvian technical branches that remain, such as the directorates for trade,

industry, agriculture, and the transportation industry, etc., where functions gradually are being

practically stopped. In part, this is happening because of the implementation of Germans as

department chiefs for various agencies – for example, in the Directorate of Forestry – or because

of removing several large industrial concerns from the jurisdiction of the Department of Industry

and subordinating them either to the Wehrmacht or to the newly-founded “Ostfaser GmbH” [“East

Fiber Ltd.”].

The founding of this new monopoly company has significantly affected the mood in Latvian

economic circles, since it is feared that Latvians will be shut out of economic life. At the same

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 42

time, this is also seen as a political measure, the more so since the large agricultural cooperative

union “Turiba” has also received a German provisional manager.

The requisitioning of the “Latvian Association” building, which currently houses the General

Directorate and is to be converted to an officers’ club, engendered a particularly unfavorable

reaction in general morale.

This concerns less the question of quarters for the General

Directorate, which through this eviction undoubtedly is suffering a further loss of its already very

shaky authority, but rather the building itself. The Latvian Association building has always been

a symbol for nationally conscious Latvians, and it must be pointed out that it has specifically been

the members of the Latvian Association who have manifested a certain solidarity with the Germans

formerly residing in Latvia and have professed themselves part of the Western cultural sphere. A

number of respected Latvians, whose outlook was significantly influenced by the German

example, have belonged to the Latvian Association since its founding. These were primarily the

so-called “decent Latvians.” The expropriation of this building, which, moreover, was built

entirely with Latvian funds, is seen all the more as a provocation which has had and will have a

crushing effect on those groups of Latvians who are pro-German.

In circles of the former Latvian armed forces and the youth it is felt to be particularly painful that

Latvians, with a few exceptions made by the Security Police, are not given an opportunity to

participate in the fight against Bolshevik Russia.

[Gustavs] Celmiņš, a well-known member of the Pērkonkrusts movement who has returned from

Berlin, spread the news in Riga that he has been successful in getting permission from Berlin to

form a Latvian Division.

Authorization had been given by the OKW as well as by the

Reichsführer-SS and the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories. It has not yet been

decided whether this division is to be organized under the aegis of the Wehrmacht or that of the

Waffen-SS. Celmiņš is undoubtedly using this news among his groups to make propaganda for

himself and the Pērkonkrusts movement.

The decree by the naval commandant in Liepāja, Captain Dr. Kavelmacher, has created unrest in

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 43

Courland. This decree announced reprisal measures against the population of Liepāja in case of

attacks on members of the Wehrmacht.

The decree states that “…in each case where a

perpetrator, regardless whether identified or not, shoots at German soldiers, a yet to be determined

number of members of the population of Liepāja will be seized and immediately shot pursuant to

martial law.” In addition, the order continues, “if an act of sabotage of any kind is attempted or

accomplished, a portion of the Latvian population in the vicinity of where the sabotage occurred

will be seized and shot pursuant to martial law.” This decree was published in the Liepāja

newspaper called “Das Kurlandische Wort.” Understandably, the population of Liepāja is in a

state of terrible agitation. It is feared that enemy forces (Communist or Jewish) will intentionally

incite further incidents. The fear of the consequences is so great that several Liepāja families

have already left the city.

Meanwhile, negotiations with the Wehrmacht commander have

established that the punitive provisions of the naval commandant’s decree will not be implemented

and that the decree will be withdrawn shortly.

The latest great successes of the German

Wehrmacht in the East have favorably influenced the morale of the Latvian people.

The

accomplishments of the German soldiers are generally recognized and admired.

The weakness of the General Directorate for Internal Administration and Personnel Issues and the

General Commissar’s publicly known refusal to work closely with this Directorate has

strengthened unity in the circles around the former Latvian Minister of Finance, [Alfred]

Valdmanis, who is currently serving as Senior State Attorney. This involves Latvians of the

former civil servant class from the Ulmanis era and Latvian industrial groups which come from

the parts of industry that were previously nationalized under Ulmanis. As a result of Valdmanis’s

temporary work as a confidential informant for economic matters with the Commander of the

Army Rear Area, these persons are once again active as directors of leading enterprises and in

Latvian economic offices. Among others, the former Director of the Bank of Latvia, [Adolfs]

Klive, belongs to this circle, as do Industrial Director Bulle and Price Inspector Kikut. Dr.

Kemna’s Latvian confidential informant, Zegars, belonged to this circle as well but apparently had

a falling-out with his former colleagues. It can be assumed, however, that he still belongs to this

clique as before and that he only relies more heavily on the German authorities – with the tacit

approval of Valdmanis – so that he can be well informed about matters that are being handled by

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 44

Dr. Kemna.

The General Commissar and his Chief of Staff, Bönning, have commented on various occasions

that they do not believe in the cooperation of Latvian administrative offices, but rather are

convinced that Berlin intends to staff the entire administration with German civil servants. A

close confidant of Rosenberg’s, the Baltic German Harald Sievert, who has been working with the

Reich leadership for a long time, is currently in Riga and has declared repeatedly here in Riga that

he believes it to be appropriate that the lower rungs of the administration be left to the Latvians

and that the German offices should merely exercise supervision.

During the period covered by this report, the General Commissar instructed that the elementary

schools are to resume their activities on October 15. The rural areas report that almost all schools

will be able to start their work so far as teaching staff, textbooks, and classrooms are concerned.

Difficulties are said to exist only in Rēzekne. There are 15,000 Wehrmacht soldiers quartered in

Rēzekne, in addition to the population of 12,000.

Sixty schools are to begin operating in Riga, but twelve of these are not functional, because the

Wehrmacht has occupied the rooms. Even the rest of the schools are forced to hold classes in

morning and afternoon shifts, because the Wehrmacht has occupied so much space.

The General Commissar has approved 33 textbooks, twenty of which have already been printed.

German is introduced in the second grade as a subject of teaching. Five to six hours of German

per week are planned for the higher grades. German language courses are running satisfactorily.

There are plans to offer supplementary adult courses on an on-going basis.

The General Commissar has given instructions to start the necessary preliminaries for opening the

Gymnasien [a prestigious type of secondary school].

The Russian ethnic group has submitted a memorandum to the Reich Commissar with the request

to permit the Russian schools to begin operating as well. The Reich Commissar will give his

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 45

approval if the General Commissar is willing to take over supervision.

The Latvian university has finished all preparations and can start lectures at any time. About

800 students have petitioned to take their final examinations. The university has registered about

400 new students.

The propaganda unit is continuing its lectures on National Socialism at the university. The

audience – faculty and students – display lively interest.

Final confirmation for appointments in judiciary circles is expected. It is hoped that younger

people will be given the opportunity to work, in order to remedy the palpable lack of local

personnel in the rural areas. Among the judges and state attorneys the speculation is expressed

that the offices will soon be filled with German jurists, and that Latvian judges and state attorneys

are to be utilized in the occupied areas in Russia. Some of the Latvian local personnel seem not

to be adverse to working in occupied Russia.

The salaries and working conditions of Latvian physicians still leave a great deal to be desired.

Even today, the physicians receive the same salary as they did during the Bolshevik period. A

doctor who has completed his university education receives 30.-- Reichsmarks per month if he

works a full shift, i.e., five hours working in a polyclinic plus house calls. After five years of

practice he receives 35.-- Reichsmarks; and after ten and more years, he receives 40.-Reichsmarks. The directors of hospitals receive a higher salary, depending on the number of beds.

An inflation supplement of 24.-- Reichsmarks is now being added to these salaries. To make ends

meet, Latvian doctors must look for additional work in other polyclinics and assume a second shift,

i.e., work 12 hours or more every day. (An unskilled truck driver, on the other hand, now makes

74.-- RM.)

The system of treatment introduced into the polyclinics by the Bolsheviks and the delivery of

medical support is poor and inadequate. This requires urgent change. The same is true for the

problem of medications. The pharmacies, especially in the provincial areas, lack medicines.

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 46

On October 5, 1941, the Russian-language newspaper “Slovo,” which is published in Latvia, was

banned. Given that the publication of a Russian-language newspaper is absolutely essential,

because a large number of people in some parts of Latgale and Riga speak only Russian,

negotiations are currently underway for a new Russian newspaper.

A new cultural agency calling itself “Erholung und Lebensfreude” [“Recreation and Joie de

Vivre”] has recently been attempting to play an active role. This agency has its headquarters in

Riga, General-Hutier-Strasse 3, and patterns itself after the German organization “Kraft durch

Freude” [“Strength through Joy”]. This institution has a German director, a Mr. Drossel, who

supposedly worked as a KdF Gauwart [Nazi Party Province Program Administrator] in Germany

and who is currently employed in the Economics Inspectorate.

The Latvian leaders of the individual divisions of this cultural agency are:

Grinberg, division chief for culture;

Mednis, conductor, section leader for music;

Lapenieks, former motion picture director, section leader for cinema and theater affairs;

Pakulis, division chief for art and special events.

The “Erholung und Lebensfreude” organization intends to establish a Latvian national theater.

The theater is to consist of the following three divisions:

1. Children’s theater

2. Traveling theater

3. Permanent theater in Riga

Mr. Drossel has already become known through the opening of the Frasquita-Varietés. The

performances of this theater are inferior.

Mr. Drossel intends to open an additional large

vaudeville theater in Riga. The quality will probably be even worse, since there are no suitable

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 47

personnel available.

As has been reported by the propaganda unit, it seems that on the German side there is the intention

to establish two German theaters in Riga. The Riga Opera House, for instance, is supposed to be

converted into a German theater, retaining some of the Latvian artistic personnel. Furthermore,

the Latvians are to receive permission to open a national theater.

On October 5, 1941, a concert was given by the Reiters Chorus in the auditorium of Riga

University, under the personal direction of Choir Director [Teodors] Reiters. Reiters led his choir

so well that even the most subtle musical nuances were perfectly expressed. The audience, which

in addition to the chiefs of the military and civil authorities consisted primarily of military

personnel and members of the Latvian intelligentsia, applauded enthusiastically and urged the

conductor to repeated encores.

The premiere of “The Flying Dutchman,” which took place on October 8, 1941, at the Riga Opera

House, was a great success.

The performance presented a superbly well-rounded overall

achievement in regard to the orchestra, choir, scenery, and vocalists. Conductor Reiters achieved

particular acclaim for his sovereign command of the enlarged orchestra, the choir, and the soloists.

The opera performance, sung for the first time completely in German and linguistically easy to

understand, was given enthusiastic applause by the German military personnel in attendance and

by the Latvian public.

The symphonic concert performed on October 9, 1941, in the Riga Opera House stood completely

under the spell of the great German musical giant, Beethoven. The well-known German chamber

virtuoso, Professor Freund of Berlin, participated with a violin concerto in the most outstanding

way. The achievements of the orchestra, made up of members of the opera orchestra and the radio

orchestra, under the ebullient leadership of the young Latvian conductor Wiegner, were described

as being very good. The audience applauded profusely during the musical presentations and, at

the end of the successful interpretation of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony, this applause intensified

into a storm of enthusiasm.

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 48

On October 13, 1941, an evening of chamber music was presented by the Riga Conservatory in

the auditorium of Riga University. Works by Mozart, Beethoven, Brahms, and Bach were

performed. The overall achievement of the performers can be considered good. The violin part

in Bach’s St. Matthew’s Passion was somewhat misunderstood. In this section, the performing

violinist completely distorted the German master, Bach, into a type of Russian romantic music.

The performances of the two productions by “Erholung und Lebensfreude” on October 11 and 13

at Wall Street and in the Riga Opera House were described as generally mediocre. Particularly

during the choral and musical presentations, one could see that the performers were not

professional artists. The performances were almost completely dilettantish. Only individual

members of the Riga Opera Ballet and some professional artists showed greater ability.

Calderon’s “Liar” was performed successfully at the theater in Jelgava.

The theater in Liepāja has already begun operations.

The administrative work for the opening of the Daugavpils Theater is fully underway.

The chief of the cultural directorate is thinking of establishing a Latvian arts agency, which would

be an organization of the creative artists of Latvia which would set authors’ royalties.

The German propaganda department has authorized the resumption of operations by the

Conservatory and the Academy of Arts. The final disposition of the issue of teaching personnel

dismissed from the Conservatory still has to be dealt with. This question is to be resolved by

agreement between German and Latvian offices.

The acquisition by Ostlandfaser GmbH of all textile factories, the paper and cellulose factories, as

well as a number of large tailoring shops, has gained much attention in Latvian political and

economic circles. On the Latvian side, one considers the founding of Ostlandfaser GmbH –

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 49

Ostlandfaser GmbH is a subsidiary of the Ostfaser GmbH in Berlin, which was created by the

Four-Year Plan and in which German self-sufficient economic branches, such as, e.g., the Textiles

Economic Group, are the principal owners – as the economic as well as political exclusion of

Latvians from the economy. These fears are further increased by the fact that another monopoly

is in the process of being established in the agricultural sector, with the participation of the Reich

Food Producers and the Reich Group for Trade. This is the “Ostland-Handels GmbH” [Ostland

Commerce Ltd.], which in turn is a subsidiary of the Osthandels GmbH [East Commerce Ltd.].

Among other things, this company is to acquire the “Turiba” central agricultural cooperative.

With the founding of this and other monopolistic companies, the most important branches of the

economy of former Latvia would be taken over by German companies. The Latvians are largely

in the dark as to how many Latvians would be included in the work force.

According to the representations made to us, the administrative staff and work force of the

individual plants are to remain undisturbed, if possible.

If warranted by their technical

qualifications, the Latvian factory directors and company managers are to be left in their positions

and taken on by Ostlandfaser.

One reason for the numerous rumors being spread in connection with “Ostland” is that the press

did not give any detailed explanations about the creation of Ostland-Faser. Interested Latvian

circles, for example, do not know that “Ostlandfaser” is part of the Four-Year-Plan, rather than an

enterprise of private benefit to Germans from the Reich.

The negative attitude of the Latvians can be explained primarily by the fact that they believe they

will lose their managerial jobs in the respective industrial branches as well as their influence on

local industry. In response to their first fear, it has to be pointed out, however, that precisely those

factories being acquired by “Ostlandfaser” – with a few exceptions – were not even in Latvian

ownership until a few years ago, but rather belonged to Germans, Jews, or Englishmen.

Especially after the resettlement of the Baltic Germans, the Latvians took over the former German

companies and thus effortlessly obtained good incomes. In general, since the Latvians have

shown little initiative as entrepreneurs, heavy industry had already been organized by the Latvians

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 50

into joint stock corporations of a monopolistic nature with decisive state participation even before

Bolshevism took over. For this reason, the objection by Latvian groups that former entrepreneurs

are being deprived of the possibility of a privatization is on the whole not applicable. The second

objection, that with the founding of these companies the Latvians have been deprived of their last

opportunity to participate in self-administration in the economic sector, is on the whole correct.

By means of the still-existing directorates for industry and commerce, Latvians familiar with the

conditions in the country have been able to make a considerable contribution to the reconstruction

of local industry. The fact that the new monopoly companies are exempted from the jurisdiction

of the industry and commerce directorates does indeed mean that the rug is being pulled out from

under this Latvian self-administrative authority. This circumstance has already led to Lettwich,

the manager of the Trades Group in the Industrial Directorate, and Schwanks, the chief of the

Industrial Directorate, recently trying to get in touch with Freimanis. Up to now, these men had

deliberately kept their distance from the General Directorate and, with the support of Dr. Kemna,

had rejected any kind of meddling in their offices by Freimanis. In so doing, they had a falling

out with Dr. Kemna’s deputy in the Supply and Distribution Office, the Latvian Zagars, since they

are of the opinion that Zagars did not adequately represent Latvian interests.

The former owners of small industries and craftsman enterprises, who are now largely heading the

companies as salaried employees, tend to want to achieve reprivatization by any means possible.

Up until now many people have considered insufficient transportation to be the cause of the poor

market supply situation in Riga. Recent experience shows, however, that this is not the cause.

Freight traffic conditions have improved substantially since September. The number of loaded

boxcars has risen to 400 per day (not counting Wehrmacht transports). Even though this figure is

far below normal, it could still be noticed that the shippers of groceries in particular are making

little use of rail transport. The market supply to Riga by rail constitutes between one-fifth and

one-sixth of the foodstuffs transported in previous years, even though transportation by truck has

almost entirely ceased.

This phenomenon is a clear indication that the price increase for

agricultural products has not at all had the desired success. The farmers have lost their trust in

money as a means of saving, and their view is further strengthened by the fact that they have no

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 51

possibility of shopping in the city. The price increase was intended chiefly to allow farmers to

supplement their inventory of agricultural machines and equipment. At the moment, however,

they are unable to purchase either machinery or necessary spare parts for repairs or important

consumer goods such as salt, vinegar, spirits, candles, matches, tobacco, and other goods.

An extensive barter economy is developing in the countryside, and people try to avoid the moneybased economy.

It would, of course, be possible to introduce an economy of compulsory

deliveries. If this were the case, however, the quality of goods, and ultimately, some of the local

industries (such as the linen, leather, and foodstuffs industries) would suffer. It is thus urgently

necessary to open stores where farmers can shop.

In connection with the shortage of food, a proposal to increase food rations in Riga has been made

to the head of the economics division of the General Commissar in Riga, Dr. Kemna. The

proposal essentially requests that food rations be adjusted to equal the standard in the Reich. Extra

rations are contemplated for workers who perform heavy labor. Putting an increase in food

rations into practice, however, will only be possible if deliveries to Riga increase.

C.

The Situation in Estonia

The public life of the country still remains in a state of waiting and transition. Since the arrival

of the Civil Administration cannot yet be predicted, major decisions are not possible. The

population’s attitude has adapted to this state of affairs. While they express a noticeable will for

reconstruction and lively interest in all necessary measures, they do not venture on their own

beyond finding solutions to the most pressing everyday problems.

Confidence in the work of the German offices is as great as ever. This manifests itself in the

understanding with which current difficulties are borne, some of which, such as questions of

transportation and raw materials, are considerable. In the political arena, there are no longer any

ambitions for national independence, even though the pleasant memory of twenty years of

statehood is still alive. The broad masses seem to be relatively apolitical and are primarily

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 52

interested in finding a basis on which to integrate their personal lives into future developments,

acknowledging without reservation that this will be determined by German forces.

In the field of legislation, a total state of transition still reigns. Public life is regulated in part by

directives from Wehrmacht offices, and in part by decrees with the force of law from the Estonian

Self-Administration, the so-called “Directorium” that was installed by the Commander of the

Army Rear Area North.

With regard to jurisprudence, only one level of criminal court has been established thus far, which

functions on the basis of the Estonian Criminal Code and the Estonian Code of Criminal Procedure

in effect before June 21, 1940.

Furthermore, lawyers and notaries once again have been

appointed, after being examined by the Director for Judicial Affairs under the supervision of the

Security Service.

Also being prepared is the introduction of civil courts, which will apply Estonian law as it was in

effect before June 21, 1940. As for other organs of justice, bailiffs and property registry offices

have not yet started functioning.

In the administrative sector, the situation is characterized by the gradual termination of the

activities of the military administration. The Commander of the Army Rear Area North has issued

a special decree ordering that instituting reforms of any kind is not among the tasks of a military

administration and thus also cannot be initiated by the Estonian Self-Administration, which is

dependent on the Commander. In the long run this naturally has an inhibiting effect. Only the

speedy installation of political administration (General Commissar) will be able to bring a solution

to the many difficulties connected to the current transition. If this current state of suspense lasts

much longer, it is liable to have damaging effects which will be difficult to correct later on. The

Estonian inhabitants, who are generally very reserved and cautious in expressing themselves on

the political and economic shaping of the future, hope for a speedy installation of the Civil

Administration.

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 53

After the initial enthusiasm over the liberation by German troops abated, a gradual increase in

Estonian national sentiment is now slowly becoming noticeable. Without tending towards antiGerman feeling, this is expressed as a heightened emphasis on things Estonian, especially when

Estonians are by themselves. On the other hand, it is now evident that their hostile attitude toward

Bolshevism also extends to those Russians who have long lived in the country and cannot

themselves be considered Communists.

This development of Estonian national sentiment in regards to culture and folklore is just

beginning and is often expressed only subconsciously. It is certain that there is a strong feeling

of self-sufficiency in this connection. This does not diminish the readiness – first and foremost

of all Estonians currently holding any leadership positions – to be closely aligned politically as

well as economically with the Greater Germanic Lebensraum. The strong sense of cultural selfworth can best be likened to the attitude that existed and to a degree still exists in some southern

German Gaus. At the same time, however, the Estonians are disposed to cultivate and accept

creations of the German people, including in the field of culture. In doing so, however, they

emphasize at least tacitly that they “also have something to offer.”

The strongest ethnic minority in Estonia are the Russians. Among the Russian petty peasant

population in the border areas, sympathy for Communism remains unchanged. This cannot be

said of the urban intelligentsia, which is recruited mainly from “White Russian” immigrants,

although it now seems that during the period of Bolshevik rule there was a widespread notion in

these circles that Bolshevism had changed over time, and that an evolutionary development had

begun, at the end of which one hoped for a reinvigorated “Little Mother Russia.” People like to

cite Molotov frequently in this connection as a person who is inwardly a Russian nationalist.

There are no detailed reports on the local Swedes. At this time their internal life is concentrated

almost entirely in the area of the church. The resident ethnic group suffered enormously through

resettlement after the Russians declared the area where they lived a fortified zone.

The Estonian population of the border area has an extremely negative stance towards the local

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 54

Russians, which has less to do with considerations of racial policy than it does with the memory

of the attitude manifested during the period of Bolshevik rule and which is still evident today.

Again and again, resettlement to the East is demanded. This request is significant from a racial

policy aspect to the extent that this concerns a section of the population that is racially inferior to

the Estonians and that, through its considerable surplus of births, shows strong tendencies to

encroach on the purely Estonian part of the population.

In the area of health services, currently being reorganized on the Reich German model by the

Estonian Social Welfare Directorium, the reduction in the number of doctors in the last two years

is being felt. Through resettlement to Germany and abduction to the USSR, the number of

physicians dropped from 974 in 1939 to 616 today. Physicians today are almost exclusively

employed in clinics and hospitals. Only a few engage in private practice. However, only in the

countryside is there a real shortage of doctors. One of the most important problems facing health

care in Estonia today is the fight against venereal diseases, which increased during the time of

Soviet rule.

The question of reopening the University of Tartu and the Technical University in Tallinn is the

focus of discussion among Estonian university circles. At this time both of these establishments

are closed. The academic personnel see themselves as relying on research work at institutes.

Since there has been no official notification regarding the further fate of the two academic teaching

establishments, university circles have repeatedly made attempts specifically to effect the

reopening of the University of Tartu.

The rector of the University of Tartu and his leading colleagues have learned from discussions

with Professor Spohr, the Chief of the Main Division for Scholarship under the Reich Commissar

for the Ostland, that Spohr is planning the following:

a)

Creation of a transitional and liquidation period for all universities in the Reich

Commissariat Ostland with the liquidation date of January 15, 1943.

b)

In connection with this, an accelerated reopening of Tartu University, limiting attendance

to the two most advanced class groups (last semesters) with the goal of rapid completion

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 55

of their studies.

c)

Starting in January 1943, a totally new university under German leadership is to be created

as a common university for all four of the Ostland General Commissariats with the mission

of cultural propagation towards the neighboring Nordic countries (Finland and Sweden).

The four nationalities of the Reich Commissariat Ostland are to retain folkloric, linguistic,

and cultural professorships.

d)

The theological faculty is to be separated from the university and re-established as an

independent theological university.

e)

Effective immediately, the underclassmen are to study in the Reich.

On Spohr’s request, the rector of the University of Tartu, Professor Kant, has announced his

willingness to assume leadership and responsibility during the transitional period, although he was

formerly a strong proponent of Estonian statehood and of fostering relations with Finland. One

has the impression that he will loyally implement the task given to him as soon as the arrangements

desired by Spohr are established by decree.

Kant showed the utmost understanding and

participated actively in the purge of the extremely liberal and Bolshevist university circles by the

Tartu Field Office of the Security Police and the SD, in the course of which about one-third of the

personnel was removed to date.

An important question in the area of the school system is that of the teaching personnel. Because

many teachers compromised themselves before their students by carrying out instruction in the

prescribed manner during the period of Soviet rule (usually under pressure), transfers and firings

will be required. An accelerated implementation of these measures is mandated by the necessity

to put immediately under firm guidance the unemployed youth, who are largely left to their own

devices, so that detrimental influences, particularly those of a criminal nature, resulting from time

and circumstances can be warded off.

As an old area of German cultural influence, Estonia is rich in cultural monuments which are of

irreplaceable value for German historical research and for cultivation of the arts. Even though

some of these art treasures were carried off by the Bolsheviks, the most valuable have been

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 56

preserved, and even military operations have not damaged them. It needs to be said that in

numerous cases the loyalty of the Estonian museum and archive officials to the cultural treasures

placed into their trust has been shown in a positive light, for example, by saving the artifacts from

the grasp of the Soviets by burying or otherwise hiding them.

Currently, the Estonian press limits itself to various bulletins and information leaflets appearing in

major cities. The Estonian Self-Administration plans the publication of a large political daily

newspaper to lay the groundwork for systematic propaganda and enlightenment work. Aside

from the press, the only other propaganda opportunities at this time are radio and cinema. In order

to replace the destroyed large transmitter at Türi, a mobile transmitter of the same capacity has

been brought in from the Reich.

In the population there is a strong need for German literature suited to explaining the most

important problems of German life and their treatment in the Reich. German newspapers are in

high demand and are sold out as soon as they appear on the stands.

Because of military operations in northern Estonia, the bringing in of the harvest was delayed by

roughly a month. At this time, however, it has been completed everywhere. Difficulties exist in

procuring fuel for the engines required for threshing. The early frosts of the last few days have

had a damaging effect on the potato harvest, such that the potatoes still to be harvested will only

be suitable for the production of alcohol. A difficult problem for the farmers is the question of

illumination. Since the agricultural enterprises as a rule do not use electric power but rather

kerosene for illumination, the lack of this material is very much felt. Various tasks have to be

neglected. For example, in some areas cows are milked only twice instead of three times a day,

which in practice means a 10% reduction in milk production.

The most burning problem in the countryside is the regulation of ownership, which became

altogether chaotic through Bolshevik nationalization. Here, old established farmers and recently

arrived settlers confront one another, where the fear among the latter that they might soon have to

relinquish the land conveyed to them by the Soviets has a crippling effect on their productivity.

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 57

In the labor market the most urgent question concerns the utilization of unemployed women. The

number of unemployed men is declining daily; and in Tallinn, for example, the number of

unemployed men is only approximately 2,000, in contrast to 18,000 unemployed women. This

imbalance was caused by the Soviets, whose deportation operations left deep holes in the male

population. There are plans to distribute the unemployed women to the countryside in order to

relieve the cities for the winter. A form of compulsory labor service is under consideration.

Scarcely any unemployment benefits are paid. The main burden of social welfare rests on the

recently founded “Estonian People’s Community Aid,” which attempts to secure funds by

voluntary collections such as the currently running “Sacrifice Week.” Up to now, however, the

gifts received have been relatively small. Cash income has totaled approximately 50,000 Marks.

The interest of the blue-collar work force is concentrated on, in addition to the much-discussed

question of prices and wages, the problems of insurance, overtime pay, Sunday labor, and mutual

assistance, problems that have not yet been fundamentally broached.

A great obstacle in the development of industry is the lack of electric power, since it will take some

time before the largely destroyed power plants can be rebuilt, and only a very limited supply of

electricity is available at this time. It cannot be expected that the power plants will work at full

capacity before the end of January 1942.

For the factories that are once again operational, such as in the leather, textile, and paper industries,

the main problem is the procurement of raw materials.

If this cannot be remedied in the

foreseeable future, work here will have to be discontinued once the supply at hand has been

exhausted. The country’s formerly sizable cellulose industry has been completely destroyed.

Good prospects exist for future development of the phosphorus and oil-shale industries, which

show broad potential for expansion; this is likewise the case for the construction materials and peat

industries, the latter to the extent that the machinery and laborers now lacking can be procured.

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 58

With the exception of grocery stores, shops are still closed, meaning that for all practical purposes,

one cannot truly speak of commerce. The shortage of goods encourages the flourishing of barter

in the countryside. There is a particularly acute shortage of kerosene, which is used as an engine

fuel and for illumination.

In the handicrafts sector, the dissolution of the collectivized, so-called “Artels” has restored

autonomy to the individual craftsman. To the extent that materials for work are available, the

craftsmen are fully employed. The prescribed fixed prices, which are considered too low by the

craftsmen, still present certain problems.

One of the greatest obstacles to reconstruction is the universal shortage of means of transportation,

which can be alleviated only gradually. The railroad has already begun with limited freight

traffic. On the average, a hundred boxcars arrive daily in Tallinn, mainly carrying foodstuffs.

In order to relieve the railroad, a regular ground transportation network will be established in the

next few days, which in part will be serviced by trucks, but mainly by local horse owners, as a sort

of service-in-kind arrangement. The idea is to secure the smooth distribution of goods via

regularly traveled routes.

Even though most banks are operating again, the currency market is marked by an almost total

absence of cash. Via the field garrisons and the Economics Detachment, loans are being offered

to the self-administrations. These loans represent almost their entire income, because the influx

of tax receipts remains at the lowest levels. Obstacles created by the internal regulations of the

Reich Kreditkassen [i.e., loaning banks] with regard to financing the Estonian Self- Administration

are to be redressed in part through negotiations with Berlin. The taxes of the former Estonian

state or of the USSR cannot be retained since conditions have changed too much. The Estonian

Self-Administration is developing a new tax system, in which revenue derived from the per-capita

tax would yield two million Reichsmarks annually and real-estate taxes would bring in

one-and-one-half million Reichsmarks. In addition, a consumer tax will be introduced. The

land, tobacco, liquor, and sales taxes are to be retained from the old system. Receipts from

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 59

customs and liquor monopolies have either dried up completely or have been drastically reduced.

It is estimated that the total deficit for 1941 will be approximately ten million Reichsmarks.

D. The Situation in White Ruthenia

Einsatzgruppe A took over the area of the General Commissariat of White Ruthenia without

finding any kind of records or reports, nor any personnel, etc. Both the office in Minsk and the

one in Baranovichi had to start completely anew, without any significant orientation from

predecessors, and hence they required a certain amount of time to gain an overview of the situation.

Therefore, for information concerning the situation of the aspects of life, we must refer to

Einsatzgruppe B reports, which presumably can be found at the Reich Security Main Office.

Reference is also made to one report sent directly from the Minsk office of Einsatzkommando lb

to the Reich Security Main Office.

Two problems chiefly confront the General Commissariat of White Ruthenia; these are:

1) the difficult situation in the question of ethnicity,

2) the continual recurrence of the formation of Communist gangs and partisan groups.

The area, most of which was under Polish rule for a long time, shows noticeable influences of

Polish culture and Polish ideas. Even though a large number of Jews still live there, it is not they

who constitute the acute danger, but rather the Poles, beyond a doubt. The Pole distinguishes

himself from the White Ruthenians and Great Russians living there by his intelligence, his national

consciousness, and his allegiance to the Roman Catholic Church. For obvious reasons, the

German administrative offices, like the Wehrmacht, have had to resort to Poles for assistance. In

each case to date, it has turned out that the Poles and also White Ruthenians of Roman Catholic

faith cannot in any way be considered reliable. The organization of a resistance movement similar

to that in the Government General or of other Polish-nationalist organizations is made relatively

easy by the fact that the railroad officials who accompany the trains into the Government General

are almost all Polish.

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 60

A report on the overall situation of the aspects of life in the General Commissariat of White

Ruthenia will be provided shortly.

Jewish Influence on Aspects of Life in the Ostland

In determining and evaluating Jewish influence in the Ostland, the following points must be taken

into account:

1)

The influence of the Jews in the three Baltic states became decisive only after the

Bolshevik seizure of power. Earlier, the Jewish situation was different in each of the three

states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

Therefore, these states will be discussed

separately, below.

2)

Whereas statistical documentation is available or can be compiled for the period in which

the three states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia were independent, statistical material is

not available for the Bolshevik period from June 1940 until the outbreak of the Eastern

War.

3)

In the old Soviet-Russian part of the Ostland territory, there likewise is no statistical

material available on the position held by Jews within Bolshevism. The findings made

for this area largely rest on the testimony of informed persons who lived in old Soviet

Russia and are familiar with local circumstances.

Only to a lesser degree could

discovered documents be evaluated.

A. The Jew in Lithuania.

During the era of independent Lithuania, Jews did not in general play a dominant role in politics.

By means of the economy and through social connections, however, their influence on public life

was quite significant from 1918 to 1926. Despite the fact that the Jewish parliamentary caucus at

that time comprised only five to six seats, each of the Lithuanian Cabinets had a Jewish Minister

for Jewish Affairs. In general politics, Jews were active only as deputy ministers; for example,

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 61

the Jew Dr. [Nachmanas] Rachmilewitz was Deputy Minister of Finance, Commerce, and

Industry; and the Jew Dr. Rosenblum was Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs.

After the 1926 political upheaval in Lithuania, when the “Tautininkai” political party, which was

free of Jews, took power, Jews disappeared completely from the political scene. The parliaments

from 1931 to 1940 no longer had Jewish delegates. There were hardly any Jews in the Lithuanian

civil service.

Nor could significant influence in cultural areas be ascertained. The University of Kaunas had

one Jewish professor and a few lecturers. The radio, which broadcast occasional Jewish programs

until 1926, was later completely free of Jews. The Lithuanian school system did not employ

Jewish teachers. The Jews, however, had their own well-organized Jewish school system during

this entire time in Lithuania. While, with the exception of a few Jewish orchestra members, there

were hardly any Jews employed in Lithuanian theaters, in Kaunas there was a privately run, very

well frequented Jewish theater.

Up to the time of the Bolshevik invasion, the influence of the Jews was limited to the economy in

particular.

According to a 1923 census, there were 153,743 Jews residing in Lithuania,

representing 7.58% of the total population. Trade in lumber, grain, textiles, leather, tobacco,

kerosene, and various foodstuffs was almost entirely in their hands.

Until 1931, 70% of

Lithuanian Jews belonged to the well-to-do middle-class, which consisted of industrialists,

businessmen, traders, and independent professionals. The economic trusts and cooperatives that

were established with state subsidies after 1931 presented strong competition against the almost

totally Jewified retail businesses and caused, beginning with that year, a constant increase in the

number of Jewish craftsmen and laborers. At the same time, the number of Jewish members of

legal or illegal Marxist organizations increased steadily.

The circumstances in the formerly Polish area around Vilnius and in the city of Vilnius itself were

the same, except that the percentage of Jews in the total population was larger. The city of Vilnius

itself had 80,000 Jews in 1938, out of a total population of 208,000.

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 62

After the Bolshevik invasion of Lithuania, many of the Jews who had already worked illegally for

Bolshevism aligned themselves quickly with the new masters. The economic department of the

Communist Party Central Committee was immediately placed under the leadership of the Jew

Schmerl-Meinin. Jews also moved to the top in almost all the other departments as well. They

mainly carried out nationalization and expropriation, assuring that the majority of the Jewish

businessmen and industrialists remained in their former firms as directors. Jews also became

directors of nationalized businesses that had not previously been owned by Jews.

Even before the Bolshevik period, occasional antisemitic undercurrents were noticeable in

Lithuania, though they did not take on significant organizational forms. Generally, the individual

Lithuanian, to the extent that he was not economically totally dependent on Jews, only tolerated

the Jews as business partners. Only rarely did mixed marriages between Lithuanians and Jews

take place.

The fact that simultaneous with the Bolshevization of Lithuania came Jewish

dominance in public life induced strong antisemitism, which seized broad sectors of the Lithuanian

people; and after the invasion of the German troops it assumed forms that German antisemitism

had never seen. Pogroms took place everywhere, and the willingness of the Lithuanian population

to help in the rapid pacification of the country was very great. During the work of pacification, it

was conclusively shown that the majority of the Bolshevik functionaries in all areas were Jewish

and that the Jews had not only welcomed the Bolshevik seizure of power in Lithuania but had

furthered it with all available means.

Despite the large number of Jews in the Vilnius area, the Jewish question is secondary to the Polish

problem in the eyes of the Lithuanian population. The strongest argument in the population of

the Vilnius area against the Poles is their sometimes very close association with the Jews.

B. The Jew in Latvia.

Whereas there were already Jewish settlements in Lithuania by 1620, the first Jews did not

immigrate to Latvia – that is to the former Livonia – until the beginning of the 18th century. In

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 63

1728 Riga already had nineteen Jewish families numbering 60 persons in all. In 1867, Riga had

5,254 Jews, equal to 5.1% of the population, and in 1935 it was 43,672 Jews, equal to 11.3% of

the population.

Jews appeared a little earlier in the former Duchy of Courland, and the concept of the “court Jew”

developed there early on as well. In 1797, there were counted 3,685 male Jews, who were

employed as court Jews at the castles of the large estate owners. Before the World War, there

were approximately 60,000 Jews in Courland. This figure declined to about 20,000 during the

World War because of deportations to the Russian interior.

Latgale, the part of Latvia longest under Polish rule, had about 18,000 Jews in 1856. By 1897

they already numbered 63,851. After the World War, a great emigration could be observed from

this area to Riga, to Poland, and to Germany, with the result that the 1935 census showed only

28,000 Jews still residing in Latgale.

The total number of Jews in Latvia in 1935 was 93,479, or 4.79% of the population.

Similar to Lithuania, the Jews in Latvia played a role only in the economic arena before the

Bolshevik period. Their influence on politics was exercised indirectly, through economic and

social connections. [Kārlis] Ulmanis, the dictator of Latvia, was a friend of the Jew [Mordehai]

Dubin, who was considered the most influential Jew and who personified the political influence

of Jewry. Generally speaking, the Latvian Jews were of Zionist orientation and, in contrast to

Lithuania, did not exert such a great influence on the illegal Marxist-Bolshevik current but rather

supported the foreign policy line subservient to England, even within their own ranks. From 1932

to 1934, the Jews were represented in parliament by three to five delegates.

Attachment 17 provides information about the distribution of Jews in the various professions.

When the Bolsheviks took power in Latvia in June 1940, the indigenous Jews were initially not

much in evidence, in contrast to Lithuania.

The functionaries coming from Soviet Russia,

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 64

however, were primarily Jews, who immediately began to train their racial comrades in Latvia and

to exclude the Zionists. With the exception of a few well-known Latvian Communists, most

public offices were staffed by Jews. During the Bolshevik period in Latvia, it was actually only

in those positions requiring a high degree of technical skill that Latvians remained in their

positions, and even then only in subordinate positions and at a lower income. In Latvia before

1940 there were no Jewish civil servants, nor did Jews work in any way in the state administration.

In the Soviet Republic of Latvia, all substantial and influential state positions were very soon in

the hands of Jews. Moreover, the questions pertaining to ethnological background and native

tongue were soon eliminated from the personnel registries of the police, courts, and residential

registry agencies in Latvia.

The numbers of Latvians, etc., harassed by the NKVD

[i.e., the Narodnyj Komisariat

Vnutrennykh Del’, or “People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs”] during the time of Bolshevik

rule that have so far been determined up to now are interesting. The total number of persons

arrested in Latvia and not subsequently released is 27,768. Of these, 22,825 were Latvians, 2,665

Russians, 787 Poles, and 227 Germans. There were 810 others, including a few Jews.

During the period of Latvian independence, Jews were completely barred from court civil service

careers. During the Bolshevik period, however, half of the judges were Jews, and in the higher

courts, especially in the Tribunal, the number of Jewish judges was 80%. In the Latvian Free

State, 19.6% of the attorneys were Jewish, and after half a year of Bolshevik rule, 32.7%. The

percentage of Jewish students enrolled in the Legal Faculty of the University of Riga rose from

3% to 21.8%.

The fact that the Jew had relatively little tangible influence on cultural areas of life in the Latvian

Free State is most of all to be attributed to Latvians jealously guarding against interference of any

kind on their own Latvian culture, which they had built up artificially on the basis of forgeries and

imitations, etc. In reality, all of Latvian cultural life was a competition between German, Western

European, Russian, and Jewish cultural influences. Bolshevism was easily able to eliminate these

Latvian cultural efforts and to impose the purely Communist line, without, to be sure, gaining the

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 65

approval of the majority of the Latvian population. Supporters of these cultural efforts were all

Jewish immigrants or local Jews, who assumed leading positions in the Latvian press immediately

after the Bolshevik seizure of power.

In the past, Latvia had separate schools for each national minority as well as a well-developed

Latvian school system. In 1933 there were 1,502 Latvian and 100 Jewish elementary schools.

When the German troops marched in, the ratio was 1,190 to 41. In 1933 there were 55 Latvian

and 14 Jewish Gymnasien; when the German troops invaded, there were 50 Latvian and 10 Jewish

Gymnasien. In this, it must be considered that after the Bolshevik seizure of power, all schools

had to admit Jewish children, and they also received Jewish teachers. In turn, a number of the

Jewish schools as well as a number of Latvian elementary schools were disbanded.

The number of students enrolled in the Riga institutions of higher education were as follows:

Winter semester 1939/40: 6,418 Latvians, 430 Jews

Winter semester 1940/41: 6,271 Latvians, 778 Jews.

The well-known Riga Conservatory had:

1933/1934:

208 Latvian and 55 Jewish students

1940:

273 Latvian and 124 Jewish students.

At the end, the faculty at the conservatory were almost exclusively Jews, after a large number of

the Latvian teachers had been dismissed. Some of these Jews were not even professionals. For

all intents and purposes, the conservatory was run during the Bolshevik period by the so-called

“Council of Pupils,” which consisted entirely of Jews. The Academy of Fine Arts was placed

under Jewish leadership as well; its Latvian director and a number of lecturers were deported.

The Bolsheviks consolidated the entire publishing industry of Latvia into a trust bearing the

designation “Waps” and placed under Jewish leadership. In this case it was primarily Jewesses

who, although lacking professional competence, managed individual departments. One of these

Jewesses had previously been a weaver in a hosiery factory. Books could only be printed if they

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 66

had been approved by the so-called “Main Administration for Literature.” This censorship office

included 25 censors, of whom 12 were proven to be Jews, two were Russian Communists, and 11

were Latvians. Of the latter, some were probably Jews with Latvian names.

In the motion picture industry, which was partly in the hands of Jews even before the Bolshevik

invasion, Jewish influence became especially strong.

distribution houses were run by Jews.

All movie theaters and all movie

Even before, Bolshevik movies considered to be

entertainment films were imported and shown by Jewish film distributors and theater owners. For

this reason, in 1939 there were already plans supported by the state to forbid Jewish ownership of

theaters. These plans did not come to fruition; and the “Film A.G.” [i.e., the “Film Corporation”],

which had been founded with state subsidies and which was to carry out these plans, was

immediately liquidated by the Bolsheviks.

The museums existing in Latvia received no attention from the Bolsheviks until January 1941,

when a few directors were exchanged or representatives of the Bolsheviks were appointed to

leadership positions in the museums. All of these were Jews. The same is true for the Latvian

State Library.

The main penetration of the Latvian economy by Jews took place in the period after the World

War. It is doubtless true that in the years following the establishment of the Free State of Latvia,

the Jews appropriated a large part of industry and commerce with the strong aid of British capital.

Various branches of industry and commerce – for example, the garment, textile, and leather

industries – were almost exclusively in Jewish hands. In 1935, a total of 22% of all industrial

laborers were employed in Jewish enterprises.

According to 1934 statistics, 28.4% of all commercial ventures in Latvia were in Jewish hands,

while the percentage of Jews in the entire population was 4.8% (See Attachment 18).

For non-corporate commercial establishments in the various economic branches, the percentage of

Jewish ownership was as follows:

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 67

Shoes and leather goods

55.3%

Textiles

49.8%

Agricultural Products

38.6%

Construction materials

49.4%

Furniture

29.7%

Jewelers

48.0%

The participation of Jews in corporations cannot be ascertained precisely.

It was probably

considerable in view of the fact that the private banks in Latvia were largely Jewified.

Jews participated in Latvian handicrafts as well, but the percentage was not as high as in

commerce. There were commercial companies in Latvia that were owned by Jews who had never

been trained in the craft in which they did business. On the other hand, there were also trained

Jewish craftsmen, such as tailors, cobblers, and furriers.

During the Ulmanis period, the Latvian government leadership attempted to eliminate Baltic

Germans from the economy as much as possible. The Jews exploited this situation; hence, the

Jewish share of the economy rose year after year. The number of Jewish wholesale enterprises,

for example, rose from 1,023 to 15,545 between 1935 and 1939. The Bolshevik regime did

appropriate and nationalize most Jewish businesses as well, but in most cases the Jews remained

as managers of these businesses, while generally the Latvians, unless they were Communists, were

replaced. Before the Bolshevik period, for example, there were 20 significant fur stores in Riga,

of which 18 were in Jewish ownership. After nationalization, all 20 stores had Jewish store

managers.

In the Bolshevik economy, especially in commerce, Jews enjoyed unlimited confidence, even

when they could not prove Communist activity. Although Jews were also abducted from Latvia,

these were almost exclusively those Jews who had played a role in the Zionist movement, or those

who had incurred the displeasure of their own racial comrades.

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 68

It has been established that Jews frequently gave themselves occupational titles without training –

for example, the director of the polyclinic in Riga was appointed by the Bolsheviks, although he

only studied medicine for two semesters in Zurich. The Jew who became the technical director

of a large plywood factory called himself an engineer, even though he had never had technical

training.

C. The Jew in Estonia.

Until the middle of the last century, Estonia belonged to a restricted zone of the Russian Empire

into which the immigration of Jewish elements from elsewhere was forbidden. This is why the

Jewish population in Estonia was numerically insignificant. In the Free State of Estonia, out of a

total population of 1.2 million people, there were approximately 4,500 Jews. Of these, 2,200

resided in Tallinn, 920 in Tartu, 260 in Walk, and 250 in Pärnu. In the countryside of Estonia,

there were in total about 80 Jews. The Jews congregated almost exclusively in business and in

the independent professions, especially as lawyers and physicians. More than half of all Jews

were independently employed and had employees of their own. The percentage of Jews in the

economy was substantially higher than their percentage in the total population. For example, up

to 11 percent of major industry in Estonia was in Jewish hands.

As the only ethnic minorities in Estonia, Germans and Jews had the right to their own cultural selfadministration according to an Estonian law of 1924.

In Estonia, too, the Jews played their role behind the scenes via their economic and Freemasonic

influence. Despite the constant antisemitic attitude of the Estonian people, the Jewish influence,

with strong foreign support, was maintained and increased steadily.

The activation of the

antisemitism of Estonians never took place.

Estonian Jewry, despite feigned loyalty and devotion to the Estonian nation, made a complete turnaround and made itself available to the Bolsheviks when they seized power. Some of the younger

generation of Jews were already under Communist influence and also partly organized. The most

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 69

prominent figure in the Bolshevik overthrow was the Jew Gutkin from Tallinn, who was the son

of the Jewish delegate in the Estonian State Council. He was an NKVD agent and joined the

NKVD full-time, together with the Tallinn Jew Feigin, who had also made a name for himself as

an organizer of the People’s Self-Defense during the overthrow.

Exactly as in the other Baltic countries, Jewish private property was nationalized, but the Jews

themselves were retained as managers in their former enterprises. A large number of Estonian

companies were likewise given Jewish managers after nationalization. Through Bolshevization,

a large number of Jews were brought to Tallinn and to the other Estonian cities soon after the

overthrow. Without exception, these fled before the arrival of the German troops.

The NKVD was the strongest bastion of the Jews in Estonia during the period of Bolshevik rule.

From there they wielded their influence, not always visibly but always decisively, in all aspects of

life. A large number of local Jews joined the NKVD, particularly in Tallinn. The People’s

Commissars for the Economy in Estonia were always Jews. Here, too, Jews came into specialized

positions without any previous training – for example, a Jewish cobbler became the director of a

glove factory.

The Estonian press was well infused with Jews by the Bolsheviks. Most cultural institutions, too,

fell into the hands of Jews, who immediately introduced the customary cultural life of Soviet

Russia.

The activity of the Jews and their influence during the Bolshevik period activated the instinctive

antisemitism of the Estonian people and made them realize that the Jew cannot be separated from

Bolshevism.

D. The Jew in the Old Soviet Russian Territory.

This report has to be limited to the area occupied by Einsatzgruppe A for a longer period of time.

The White Ruthenian areas around Minsk and Baranovichi were taken over by Einsatzgruppe A

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 70

only a short while ago. Pertinent documents were not taken over at that time; hence, one must

refer to the reports of Einsatzgruppe B concerning this area.

In the old Soviet Russian area between Lake Ilmen and Lake Peipus, the following picture

emerges:

In the era of the czars, many kinds of limitations, varying by area, were imposed on the Jews.

Jews appeared almost exclusively in commerce, mainly in the countryside and as an itinerant

peddler. Only a few Jews were permitted to reside in the large cities, and even then only in the

suburbs. Under the czars, the Jew had hardly any influence, and for that reason he always heavily

participated in the revolutionary movements within the Russian Empire. To be sure, under the

czars, the Jewish question was viewed solely from the standpoint of religion.

According to the reports of older people familiar with this area, the various pogroms during the

Imperial period also had an impact in the area between Lake Peipus and Lake Ilmen. In particular,

serious pogroms took place in the countryside and in the small towns in 1917. The success of the

October Revolution brought complete freedom to the Jews, and at that time they poured into the

large cities. According to the Soviet Law on Nationalities, Jews were no longer referred to as

“Jews,” but only as “Hebrews.” The use of the word “Jew” was penalized.

According to available reports and testimony, it became apparent during the initial years of the

Bolshevik regime that gradually Jews were obtaining leading positions everywhere; in later years,

the population was accustomed to a large number of leading personalities in the Soviet state being

Jews. The traditional antisemitic sentiments, born of the strong religious faith of the population,

decreased from year to year in proportion to the increase in atheism. It is interesting to note that,

according to all available reports, the parts of the population which returned to the church after the

arrival of the German troops also simultaneously manifested an antisemitic attitude. According

to testimony and agents’ reports from Petersburg, antisemitic tendencies can be noticed there as

well, but because of the great terror there is no prospect that these sentiments will be activated for

the time being.

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 71

In evaluating the question of Jewish influence on Bolshevik aspects of life it has to be noted that

a large number of Jews, especially those in public life, have changed their names. By taking

particularly typical Russian names, they try to hide their Jewish heritage.

The books which effusively praise Bolshevism and its leaders are by Jews. In particular, Jewish

emigrants from Germany have made a name for themselves by publishing skillful writings. Lion

Feuchtwanger, who came to Soviet Russia in 1936, published a book in 1938 following the

political trials which was widely distributed, because it glorified Stalin and Bolshevism in an

unprecedented manner. It is evident from the Communist Party propaganda material found so far

that propaganda leaflets have in most cases been produced by persons bearing Jewish names; those

bearing Russian names might also be Jews.

Mixed marriages between Jews and Russian Communists were known as such among the

population, even though it was not permitted to talk about it.

Jews were especially prominent as speakers at Communist Party meetings. According to the

reports, it was known to the population that Jews had managed to obtain political offices and

officers’ posts in the Red Army and seldom served as common soldiers. According to the

testimony of one Politruk [i.e., political leader (in each Red Army unit)], there were four Jews and

one Jewess among the 15 participants in his group at the Higher Military Pedagogical Institute in

Moscow, where he was being trained. The Jewess held the position of a Politruk within the group.

Besides the spheres of propaganda and the press, the strongest Jewish influence in the Soviet Union

can be felt in the areas of film and theater. According to what has been determined in the area of

the Einsatzgruppe and reports from Petersburg, approximately 80% of all leading positions in this

sphere are in Jewish hands. Approximately 40% of the actors and singers are Jews, as are about

70% of the members of the orchestra. The faculty of the Conservatory of Leningrad is almost

purely Jewish; 60% of the students are Jews. There were four leading positions at the secondlargest Soviet Russian film corporation, “Lenfilm,” which was located in Petersburg; one of them,

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 72

the position of director, was held by a Russian, and the other three were filled by Jews. All film

directors at “Lenfilm,” and 70% of all office and production staff were Jewish. Well-known

Bolshevik directors of “Lenfilm” are the Jews Dziga [Vertov], [Sergei] Eisenstein, and [Iosif]

Kheifits.

None of the teachers’ positions in the countryside and in the smaller towns, nor the lower teaching

positions in Petersburg, were held by Jews. In the higher schools, Jews taught subjects of a

political nature, such as civics, economics, history, etc.

According to reports, 130 of 370

Petersburg principals are Jews. Forty percent of the personnel of the People’s Commissariat of

Petersburg are Jews. The existing public libraries, which have simultaneously been a means of

Bolshevik propaganda, are exclusively in Jewish hands. One of the largest public libraries, the

“Saltykov-Shchedrin Library” in Petersburg, with approximately 10 to 11 million volumes, is

completely under Jewish leadership.

The following could be learned concerning the composition of the teaching staff at the Petersburg

institutions of higher education: historians, lawyers, and doctors - 60% Jews; engineers - 20% to

25% Jews. Approximately one-third of the student body is Jewish. In the departments of history

and law about 50% of the students; in medicine about 70% are Jews. The strongest representation

of Jews was in the political institutes. Jews reportedly make up about 90% of the leading party

dogmaticians in Petersburg.

One office that is said to be heavily staffed with Jews is the People’s Commissariat for Legal

Affairs in Petersburg, where 60 % of the total personnel are Jewish.

In the economy, Jews appear in leading positions everywhere, as much in small towns and in the

countryside as in Petersburg.

The establishment of cooperatives was particularly strongly infiltrated by Jews. It is reported

from Petersburg that the management of the large warehouses as well as economic administrative

positions are almost completely staffed by Jews. There were few Jews among the skilled and

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 73

unskilled workers in the factories. The handicraft trades in Petersburg are said to have a relatively

large number of Jews (up to 30%), and the handicraft cartels are reportedly run almost exclusively

by Jews.

According to findings made to date, the general impression is that Jews have managed to gain

influence in all areas that suit their mentality. In the entire old Soviet Russian area occupied to

date, it is found that a Jew was sitting somewhere in all leading political and economic

organizations, cartels, and other institutions. Even if this Jew was not usually serving as the leader

or director, he nonetheless held the number two or three position. This was likewise the case in

all NKVD offices identified to date, where the most important positions were likewise held by

Jews, even if these were usually not the top position.

The following facts can be attributed without a doubt to Jewish influence in the Bolshevik regime:

1) Every attempt at racial thinking has been suppressed in favor of the dogma of a Proletarian

International. Only in the last few years, when it was feared that the national will for defense

would suffer precisely from this, a certain national Russian note was added to the overall

propaganda, which was, however, deliberately free from everything racial.

2) In the politics and economics of the Soviet Union the anonymity of responsibility has been

elevated to a principle. No institution has a director or leader who is actually responsible;

rather, the leadership’s influence is co-anchored, next to them, in sometimes unimpressive,

adjacent positions.

3) The emancipation of women in Soviet Russia, the beginnings of which reach far back into the

times of the czars and which probably even then was influenced by Jews, has reached deep

into the ranks of working nonintellectual people. The masculine woman in a male profession

is a fact of life in the current picture of the Soviet Union.

The extent to which the unmistakable de-eroticization of public life is due to Jewish influence

cannot be determined at this time. All public life in the occupied areas seems to show at any rate

that human sexual instincts have been reduced to the most primitive level of a purely physical

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 74

function, which in and of itself does not correspond at all to the Russian national character.

From all available reports the picture emerges that the strong influence of Jewry on all aspects of

life in Soviet Russia was well known to the non-Jewish population.

Every stirring of

antisemitism, however, was repressed by terror, as was every countermovement against

Bolshevism itself. One can assume that a weakening of Bolshevik terror would most of all result

in the revival of an active anti-Jewish attitude in the population also in the areas that are not

occupied.

Predicaments and Recommendations for Eliminating Them

1) Lack of clarity on the part of the Germans offices over the future form of administration.

Lack of clarity about the manner in which the indigenous population can participate in the

administration of the state and the economy.

Recommendation:

a. Establish clarity on the part of the German administrative offices on the future of the

Baltic peoples and their form of government, and

b. Clarity about the kind of participation by suitable local people in the administration

as well as in the economy.

2) Lack of clarity concerning the issue of participation by the Baltic peoples in the war against

Soviet Russia.

Recommendation:

a.

Either participation within the German Wehrmacht without separate units, which would

have to entail subsequent Germanization, or

b. A general prohibition against utilization other than in the police service within their own

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 75

territory and an absolute adherence to this ban.

3) The active youth of the Baltic peoples, especially the academic youth, still have no political

or ethnic leadership.

Recommendation:

The creation of more-or-less disguised youth organizations which, independently of one

another and under German supervision, take over the political and ideological leadership of

the youth.

4) German propaganda is inadequate.

Recommendation:

Systematic implementation of propaganda which does not presuppose anything and which in

particular makes use of those media that thus far have received too little attention, namely the

Latvian- and Russian-language press, literature in the various national languages, and those

cultural institutions that do not utilize the German language. A prerequisite for this is total

clarity as to the desired political and ethnic goals and the form of administration.

5) A steadily increasing number of undesirables is to be found in the Baltic countries among the

resettled Baltic Germans and among those Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians who have

been permitted to resettle with the support of Reich German offices. These undesirable

persons are those, who (a) want to take petty revenge on the local peoples or on persons known

to them for harm they may have suffered to a greater or lesser degree, or (b) who have a

pronounced liberalistic economic attitude and are trying to attain a position in the economy

for reasons of personal gain.

These people have somehow received letters of

recommendation from Reich German offices, even though they had been rejected by other

Baltic Germans, especially the Baltic German SS officers, because of their known liberalistic

attitude and their individualistic economic point of view.

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 76

Recommendation:

Strict supervision by the Reich Security Main Office of re-settlers permitted to immigrate.

6) The price and wage rates in the Ostland area are not in alignment with one another. While

the prices for agricultural products, i.e., the main products for feeding the population, have

been raised significantly, the wages and the lower salaries have not kept up with this price

increase. Apart from that, the price increases bring no benefit to the farmers, since they

cannot get goods for their money.

Recommendation:

Simplification of the German economic administration and the integration of the interests of

individual branches of the economy. Employment of suitable, dependable, local nationals

familiar with conditions in the country as advisers.

7) There is still complete uncertainty over the question of whether or not there will be

reprivatization in the Baltic countries, and, if so, to what extent.

Recommendation:

This question of general and fundamental interest, which has considerable influence on the

overall mood of the population, must be dealt with through propaganda. If (a) reprivatization

is to be carried out, it must be made known as soon as possible, even if implementation takes

place at a later time, or if (b) reprivatization is not to take place at all, or only to a limited

extent, then the population should be prepared for this fact through skillful propaganda

beginning today. A sudden announcement of intent concerning this issue would either cause

a run on the economy and industry, which, as experience shows, benefits only those who have

sharper elbows or better connections and not the truly deserving, or it would foster such

disharmony, disinclination to work, and obvious comparisons with the Bolshevik system, that,

on the one hand, difficulties would arise for the Security Police and, on the other, economic

sabotage would certainly occur.

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 77

8) Lack of clarity at the Reich Commissariat concerning the jurisdiction of the police and about

the involvement of the future Befehlshaber of the Security Police (BdS) as a political adviser

to the Reich Commissar.

After the Reich Security Main Office agreed in principle to the involvement of the BdS as a

political adviser, the Higher SS and Police Leader also negotiated the involvement of the

police in administrative matters in the context of these negotiations.

Recommendation:

To raise at the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories and to bring to clarity the

questions of the insertion of the police in the Reich Commissariat and the appointment of the

respective BdS as political advisers to the Reich Commissars.

9) Lack of clarity on the internal structure of the police in the Ostland.

An SS and Police Leader has demanded that the Security Police use the name “SS and Police

Leader - Kommandeur of the Security Police [KdS]” and that the leader of the Security Police

present all reports, letters, and submissions, etc., that are to be sent to offices at the same and

higher level to the SS and Police Leader for signature. That would mean that the direct

routing of reports within the Security Police is no longer ensured.

SS and Police Garrison Leaders have demanded that the Security Police in the locations

concerned subordinate themselves to them, issue correspondence over their signatures, or in

general act solely under of the SS and Police Garrison Leader.

One SS and Police Garrison Leader carried out an execution in the Security Police sector

without having communicated with the local leader of the Security Police.

Moreover, a Territorial Commissar demanded that the SS and Police Garrison Leader act only

under the Territorial Commissar.

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 78

In all of these cases, the Security Police pointed out that it has hitherto been organized in

Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos.

Recommendation:

To clarify the internal structure of the police as soon as possible. In doing so, it is necessary

to point out that the BdS has direct command authority over the KdS, who in turn has direct

command authority over branch offices of the Security Police. This means that the SS and

Police Leader and the SS and Police Garrison Leaders are not involved in the internal structure

of the Security Police.

10) As was already reported in person to the Chief of the Security Police and the SD, the Main

Office of the Order Police has ordered that in cities of particular interest to the Security Police

the officers appointed to be SS and Police Garrison Leaders are to be officers of the Order

Police. Since there is a shortage of officers in the Security Police, it will no longer be possible

to appoint SS officers except in those towns in which the Security Police is required to furnish

the SS and Police Garrison Leaders. Thus the danger exists that cities especially important

to the Security Police can only be staffed with non-commissioned officers.

Recommendation:

To clarify with the Main Office of the Order Police that officers of the Security Police and the

SD are to be installed as SS and Police Garrison Leaders in cities of special importance for

the Security Police.

11) As far as is known here, the Order Police has promoted by one rank most of the officers of the

Order Police designated to become SS and Police Garrison Leaders. As a result, it is

exclusively Staff Officers of the Order Police that have come to be known as SS and Police

Garrison Leaders.

Recommendation:

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 79

In the Security Police, as well, to promote when feasible those SS officers who will remain in

the East and be placed in important positions.

12) The civilian and especially military agencies constantly ask questions about the general

internal and foreign policy situation, since they rightfully assume that the politically oriented

officers are kept informed by the Security Police and the SD. Aside from the consolidated

major reports concerning the experiences of the Security Police in the Eastern Campaign,

neither the chiefs of the Einsatzgruppen nor the leaders of the Einsatzkommandos have

received any political news to date.

Recommendation:

To provide chiefs of the Einsatzgruppen and leaders of the Einsatzkommandos with all reports

concerning internal affairs and foreign policy, as well as with event reports.

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 80

List of Attachments

Attachment

1a:

Total Strength of Einsatzgruppe A

1b:

Distribution Chart of Members of Einsatzgruppe A across the Einsatzkommandos

2:

Garrison Locations for the Officers of Einsatzgruppe A [not included here]

3:

Routes of March by Einsatzgruppe A [not included here]

4:

Strength and Distribution of the Auxiliary Police

5:

Occupancy of the Jails

6:

Special Report on the GPU in Latvia [not included here]

7:

Overview of the Highest Offices of the Estonian SSR [not included here]

8:

Overview of the Number of Executions Carried Out to Date

9:

Report of Experiences on Partisan Suppression

10:

Organizational and Functional Distribution Plan for the Criminal Police in Latvia

11:

Functional Overview of the Latvian Criminal Police

12.

Organizational and Functional Distribution Plan for the Criminal Police in Estonia

13.

The Peoples of the Baltic States [not included here]

14.

Employees by Branch of the Economy in the Baltic States [not included here]

15.

Employees of the Main Economic Groupings in the Baltic States [not included]

16.

Number of Jewish Population by County [not included here]

17.

Percentage of Jews in the Branches of the Economy

18.

Participation of Jews in the Number of Latvian Commercial Enterprises

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 81

Attachment la

TOTAL STRENGTH OF EINSATZGRUPPE A

133

Order Police

13.4 %

87

Auxiliary Police

8.8 %

89

Gestapo

9.0 %

41

Criminal Police

4.1 %

35

SD

3.5 %

18

Administration

1.8 %

172

Motor Vehicle Drivers

17.4 %

340

Waffen-SS

34.4 %

8

Radio Operators

0.8 %

3

Teleprinter Operators

0.3 %

13

Female Employees

1.3 %

900

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 82

Attachment lb:

Distribution Chart of the Members of Einsatzgruppe A across the Einsatzkommandos.

SS Reservists

Einsatzkommando

Einsatzkommando

Einsatzkommando

Einsatzkommando

1a

1b

2

3

25

24%

26

23.7%

Teleprinter Operators

41

23.6%

1

0.8%

32

22.9%

Radio Operators

2

1.9%

1

0.4%

2

1.2%

1

0.7%

Interpreters

14

13.7%

6

5.4%

18

10.8%

8

5.6%

20

18.2%

15

10.5%

Auxiliary Police

Female Employees

1

0.9%

4

2.4%

1

0.7%

Gestapo

18

16.2%

12

11%

26

15.6%

29

20.6%

Criminal Police

11

10.5%

6

5.4%

13

7.8%

10

7%

SD

8

7.8%

3

2.7%

8

4.8%

10

7%

Administration

3

2.9%

2

1.8%

4

2.4%

1

0.7%

Drivers

23

22.1%

34

30.9%

50

29.4%

34

24.3%

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

105

110

170

141

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 83

Attachment 4

Strength and Distribution of the Lithuanian and Latvian Auxiliary Police

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 84

Agencies of the Latvian Auxiliary Police.

General Directorate for Internal Security

Administrative Section and Financial Section

50 civil servants

Riga Prefecture

Police Reserve Section

Address Bureau

Administrative Section

Economics Section

External Section and Passport Section

112 civil servants

Political Police

Riga

217

Jelgava

33

Liepāja

33

Daugavpils

33

Valmiera

33

Gulbene

33

Rēzekne

33

415 civil servants

Criminal Police

Riga

151

Daugavpils

23

Jelgava

23

Liepāja

23

220 civil servants

Schutzmannschaft (of the Order Police)

13 police districts City of Riga

Mounted Police Section

Harbor Police

1,370 civil servants

Carryover

2,167 civil servants

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 85

Carryover

2,167 civil servants

Recruitment Reserve of the Auxiliary Police

1,200 civil servants

Concentration Camp Administration

860 civil servants

Liepāja Prefecture

207 civil servants

Daugavpils Prefecture

176 civil servants

Railroad Police

145 civil servants

County Police

County of Riga

240 civil servants

@

Cēsis

81

@

Madona

85

@

Valmiera

115

@

Valka

108

@

Liepāja-Aizpute

107

@

Kuldīga

79

@

Ventspils

87

@

Jelgava

181

@

Tukums

66

@

Talsi

52

@

Bauska

57

@

Jēkabpils

67

@

Ilūkste

75

@

Daugavpils

170

@

Rēzekne

160

@

Ludza

111

@

Abrene

104

6,700

civil servants

Prisons in the City of Riga:

Administration

24

Central Prison

284

Temporary Prison

100

Prison for Minors

29

437 civil servants

Carryover

7,137 civil servants

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 86

Carryover 7,137 civil servants

In the Provincial Areas:

Daugavpils

186

Valmiera

186

Rēzekne

106

Jelgava

106

Liepāja

106

Liepāja Detention Jail

Cēsis

39

106

Ventspils

26

Tukums

23

Alūksne

23

Madona

23

Ludza

23

Jēkabpils

23

Valka

32

1,008 civil servants

Education and Correctional Institutions:

State Educational and Correctional Institution for Boys in Irlava

49

State Educational and Correctional Institution for Girls in Ropaži

24

73 civil servants

Total:

8,218 civil servants

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 87

Lithuanian Auxiliary Police.

Lithuanian Security Department in Kaunas

140 civil servants

Security and Criminal Police

Kaunas Urban

233 civil servants

Kaunas Rural

129

Šiauliai

33

Telšiai

28

Panevėžys

21

Mirijampolė

35

Vilnius

131

Reporting offices

Kaunas

+

83 civil servants

Vilnius

Total: 833 civil servants

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 88

Attachment 5

Occupancy of the Jails.

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 89

Jails in Lithuania.

Einsatzkommando 3 has ascertained the current occupancy of the jails in Lithuania.

Currently in detention in Kaunas are:

in the Central Jail

520 persons,

of whom 50 are Jews,

in the Police Jail

69 persons,

of whom 3 are Jews.

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 90

Jails in Latvia.

Jail

Political Prisoners

1.

Riga Central Prison

2.

Criminal Prisoners

2,837

63

Riga Temporary Prison

672

24

3.

Daugavpils

181

15

4.

Valmiera

507

21

5.

Jelgava

921

45

6.

Liepāja

404

12

7.

Cēsis

222

14

8.

Ventspils

143

3

9.

Tukums

101

7

10. Madona

145

1

11. Jēkabpils

84

8

12. Alūksne

83

1

13. Ludza

167

16

14. Rēzekne

597

13

Total:

7,064

Total:

243

7,307

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 91

Jails in Estonia.

Jail

Capacity

Current Occupancy

Remarks

1.

Tallinn Central Jail

1,200

2,600

--

2.

Tallinn Women’s

Jail

350

--

Currently receiving

occupants

3.

Harku

700

400

Concentration

Camp (Jews)

4.

Murru

500

40

Concentration

Camp

5.

Pärnu

500

950

--

6.

Tartu

500

400

--

7.

Viljandi

400

1,000

--

8.

Rakvere

400

500

--

9.

Pechory

500

2,700

--

10.

Narva

200

300

--

11.

Võru

200

350

--

12.

Valga

150

200

--

13.

Paide

80

150

--

14.

Haapsalu

80

160

--

15.

Kuressaare

80

--

unoccupied

16.

Laitse

300

--

Colony institution

for minors.

Receipt of

occupants will take

place momentarily.

Total:

6,140

9,750

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 92

Attachment 8

OVERVIEW OF THE NUMBER OF EXECUTIONS

CARRIED OUT TO DATE

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 93

OVERVIEW OF THE NUMBER OF EXECUTED PERSONS.

Jews

Lithuania

Kaunas Territory, City & Rural 31,914

Territory of Šiauliai

41,382

Territory of Vilnius

7,015

80,311

Jews

Latvia

Riga Territory, City & Rural

Territory of Jelgava

Territory of Liepāja

Territory of Valmiera

Territory of Daugavpils

9,256

30,025

Estonia

Jews

474

White Ruthenia

7,620

Summary

Lithuania

Latvia

Estonia

White Ruthenia

Jews

80,311

30,025

474

7,620

118,430

Communists

Total:

80

763

17

860

31,994

42,145

7,032

81,171

Communists

589

1,843

Communists

684

Total:

6,378

3,576

11,860

209

9,845

31,868

Total:

1,158

7,620

Communists

860

1,843

684

-3,387

In addition:

Jews eliminated through pogroms in Lithuania and Latvia

Jews, Communists, and partisans executed in the old Russian territory

Mentally ill

Communists and Jews liquidated by the Gestapo and SD Sector Tilsit in the Border Strip

Total

81,171

31,868

1,158

7,620

121,817

5,500

2,000

748

122,445

5,502

135,567

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 94

Attachment 9

REPORTS ON ACTIVITIES AND EXPERIENCES

IN THE FIGHT AGAINST PARTISANS

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 95

The Befehlshaber of the Security Police

and the SD

Einsatzgruppe A

Riga, September 29, 1941

Experience Report on the Fight Against Partisans.

In the first weeks of the Eastern Campaign, in the area of the Army Group North behind the German

lines up to a point deep into the Army Rear Area, ambushes upon solitary motor vehicles in motion and

upon smaller columns; acts of sabotage on railroad lines, streets, and bridges; destructions of telephone

and telegraph installations; ruining of provisions depots; etc.; were carried out on a scale that increased

on a daily basis. The source of these acts of sabotage was the Red Partisan Groups deployed to the

rear of the German front. In a speech rebroadcast daily on the radio from July 3 to 7, 1941, Stalin

called for the formation of such groups.

Partisan activity can in no way be compared to the sniper menace during the campaigns in Poland

and in the West. Whereas those were ill-prepared and partially improvised operations on the part of a

harried civilian population, the Soviets are deploying with their partisan groups an organization that is

well-prepared. The formation of partisan groups is not an invention of this war. In fact, Soviet

military literature has for some time dealt in detail with the value of partisan organizations and their

method of operations.

During the first weeks of the Eastern Campaign, little was known concerning the strength,

organization, and combat methods of the partisans. For this reason, systematic combat against the

partisans was initially extremely difficult and occasionally not very successful. Since the number of

ambushes and sabotage acts increased steadily, and because the partisan activities caused substantial

losses of human life and materiel and also provoked considerable anxiety behind the German lines, a

systematic means of fighting against the partisans had to be found.

The Einsatzkommandos of Einsatzgruppe A of the Security Police have participated in the

suppression of the partisans from the start. Close cooperation with the Wehrmacht and the exchange

of information gathered during partisan suppression has gradually provided precise knowledge as to

the origin, organization, strength, equipment, and mode of operation of the Red Partisans. The

Einsatzkommandos of the Security Police did not limit themselves to fighting the partisan squads

appearing in their area of operation but made an effort to contribute to the intensification of counterintelligence activities and to make the special potential of the work of the Security Police useful.

Russian deserters and prisoners of war, as well as captured partisans, were carefully interrogated. The

IMT (Nuremberg) Document L-180, p. 96

material found on their persons was pieced together in painstaking labor, and the experiences gathered

by the individual Einsatzkommandos during the suppression of the partisans were carefully evaluated.

The essential results of this work are summarized below:

I. Origin and Organization of the Partisans:

From the moment the first partisan groups appeared, their diverse composition became apparent.

1) According to the accounts of Russian prisoners-of-war, deserters, and captured partisans, it is

evident that ten partisan regiments were organized in Petersburg from the beginning of the war.

Each of the ten military districts in Petersburg received the order to assemble one regiment of 1,000

men. The regiments were structured into 10 battalions with 100 men each. Membership in these

partisan regiments was voluntary. These volunteers came in part from the Soviet Army and in part